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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 1997, the mother of a Georgia teenager picked up
a telephone in her home and found that her daughter, then thirteen years
old, was engaged in conversation with Kyle Richard Bishop.' While it is
not unusual for a thirteen-year-old girl to talk on the telephone, the con-
versation that the young girl's mother overheard that day was not a typi-
cal teenage conversation. In fact, the conversation was very much atypi-
cal for two reasons. First, Bishop was a thirty-eight-year-old man who,
along with his wife, lived across the street from the young girl.2 Second,
the conversation involved both talk of a sexual nature and discussions of
killing the young girl's parents.3
Concerned for her daughter's safety and well-being, the young
girl's mother contacted law enforcement and informed them of what she
had overheard.4 The authorities immediately launched an investigation of
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Brigham Young University, 1998; J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University,
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1. Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Bishop, but it stalled as quickly as it started because the young girl de-
nied that anything inappropriate had occurred between her and Bishop.5
Not satisfied, the girl's parents took matters into their own hands. Spe-
cifically, "[w]ithin hours of the police interview, the victim's parents
went to Radio Shack and purchased a tape recorder to record all of the
phone calls to and from their home. After installing the equipment, the
parents recorded numerous phone conversations between Bishop and the
victim."6 Copies of these conversations were later turned over to law en-
forcement. These tapes, in conjunction with the young victim's testi-
mony "that she had engaged in sexual acts with Bishop, 7 ultimately led
to Bishop's indictment on charges of child molestation, aggravated child
molestation, and aggravated sexual battery.8
As the case against Bishop proceeded, prosecutors sought to use the
taped conversations as evidence against him.9 In response, Bishop filed a
challenge to the prosecution's use of the tapes, arguing that they were
recorded in violation of Georgia law. 10 The trial court denied Bishop's
motion.' In so doing, it relied on a legal doctrine known as the doctrine
of vicarious consent. 2 Though the trial court was ultimately overruled on
the issue, based on the language of a specific Georgia statute,' 3 it ex-
pressed a belief that has been adopted by a small handful of federal and
state courts.' 4 Specifically, the trial court adopted the view that a parent
can surreptitiously tape record a minor child's telephone conversations
with a third party-and do so without violating federal and state wiretap
statutes-if the parent has a good faith and objectively reasonable basis
for believing that recording the conversations is in the minor child's best
interest.15
This Article will address the little-used but important doctrine of
vicarious consent; in particular, this Article will argue that the doctrine
should be more widely accepted by the criminal courts. Part II gives a
brief overview of the federal wiretap statute, its state law counterparts,
and the doctrine of vicarious consent that has emerged as courts have
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 919.
8. Id.
9. Id.
1O. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 920.
13. Id. at 919.
14. See infra Part II.13.2.
15. Bishop, 526 S.E.2d at 920.
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interpreted federal and state wiretap legislation. Part III addresses the
doctrine's viability and, as referenced above, argues that it should be ac-
cepted by the criminal courts. Specifically, Part III argues that when a
parent records a child's telephone conversations with a third party out of
a true concern for the child and under a belief that doing so is in the
child's best interest, those recordings should be available for use during a
criminal prosecution as evidence against both the third party and, if nec-
essary, the child whose parents recorded the conversations. Finally, Part
IV briefly addresses important procedural issues arising when criminal
courts accept the vicarious consent doctrine, and Part V concludes by
summarizing the policies, issues, and answers presented herein.
II. BACKGROUND
The judicially created doctrine of vicarious consent has developed
over the last ten years through a series of little-referenced but significant
federal and state court decisions. 16 These court decisions, though rela-
tively few in number, have uniformly held that parents who secretly, but
with appropriate motivations, record a child's telephone conversations
can avoid civil and criminal liability under federal and state wiretapping
laws that generally prohibit such action. 17 This section addresses those
federal and state laws, the creation and nature of the vicarious consent
doctrine, and the various criticisms that have been leveled against it.
A. The Federal Wiretap Statute
Enacted in 1968 as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, the federal wiretap statute governs the interception and cap-
ture of wire and other specified communications. 18 As stated by the
United States Supreme Court, the purpose of Title III is "to prohibit, on
the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire
communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act."'19
Because the doctrine of vicarious consent necessarily involves parental
interception and capture of a child's communications, understanding the
basics of Title III is a prerequisite to understanding the doctrine itself.
16. See infra Part Il.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.2.
18. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
19. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974). The stated purpose of Title Ill, as
found in its legislative history, is to "prohibit[] all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons
other than duly authorized law enforcement officials engaged in the investigation of specified types
of major crimes after obtaining a court order, with exceptions provided for" in the code. S. REP. No.
1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113.
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Specifically, to fully understand the ramifications of the vicarious con-
sent doctrine, what is needed is a basic understanding of Title III's his-
tory, combined with an overview of the process for obtaining a valid
wiretap, the penalties associated with violations of the federal wiretap
statute, the consent exception to the general prohibition of wiretapping,
and the applicability of Title III in domestic situations.
1. A Brief History of the Federal Wiretap Statute
As stated above, Congress enacted the federal wiretap statute in
1968 as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
Prior to Title III's existence, wiretapping by both law enforcement and
private citizens was governed by the Federal Communications Act of
1934.2o In 1986, nearly twenty years after its enactment, Congress
amended and updated Title III to keep pace with technological advance-
ments in the area of wiretapping and eavesdropping. 2 1 The original act,
which was passed to assist law enforcement in the investigation and
prosecution of organized crime and to protect the privacy rights of
United States citizens against the unwarranted interception of telephonic
and other communications,22 was a response to two key decisions by the
20. Title III was enacted, in part, because of concerns that the Federal Communications Act did
not adequately protect the privacy rights of the American people. See S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), re-
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154.
21. The amendment was part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. See
Shana K. Rahavy, Note, The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the
Family Home, 2 J. HIGH TECH. LAW 87, 87 (2003).
22. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (holding that the overriding concern
of the drafters of Title Ill was the protection of privacy). See also Rahavy, supra note 21, at 87 (writ-
ing that Title III was enacted to "better articulate a balance between the privacy rights of individuals
and the legitimate needs of law enforcement").
Title Ill's legislative history also addresses this issue, stating that the "dual purpose" of the
legislation is to "protect[] the privacy of wire and oral communications" and to "delineat[e] on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral com-
munications may be authorized." S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2153. In this regard, one major impetus for the passage of Title III was the concern that advances in
technology had led to more widespread invasions of personal privacy. Congress addressed this con-
cern in the legislative history:
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in the
last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveil-
lance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is seri-
ously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance. Commercial and employer-labor
espionage is becoming widespread. It is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct busi-
ness meetings in private. Trade secrets are betrayed. Labor and management plans are re-
vealed. No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left
alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or
commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the
speaker to the auditor's advantage.
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United States Supreme Court. In the first case, Berger v. New York,23 the
Supreme Court ruled that Fourth Amendment protections apply to the
electronic eavesdropping of oral communications such that conversations
intended to be private are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 24 The
Berger Court further "delineated the constitutional criteria that electronic
surveillance legislation should contain., 25 In the second case, Katz v.
United States,26 the Court held that when there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, intercepting a telephone conversation in a public tele-
phone booth constitutes a search and seizure for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.2 7 Title III was enacted to provide for compliance
with these two rulings and the constitutional standards that they set forth
for the lawful interception of covered communications.2 8
2. An Overview of Title III
In its current form, Title III is a very complex piece of legislation
that addresses many different aspects of legal and illegal wiretapping.
With respect to the doctrine of vicarious consent, however, only a few
portions of the legislation are particularly relevant. These portions of the
law, which include the basic process for obtaining a valid wiretap, the
penalties associated with violations of Title III, and the one-party consent
exception to the general prohibition against wiretapping, are discussed
below.
a. Obtaining a Legally Valid Wiretap
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, Title III "prescribes
the procedure for securing judicial authority to intercept wire communi-
cations in the investigation of specified serious offenses., 2 9 Title III also
identifies the types of interceptions that are lawful and those that are not
in an effort to "safeguard privacy in oral and wire communications while
Id. at 2154. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by
government actors, the restrictions found in Title II1 apply to government and private persons alike.
23. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24. Id. at 63.
25. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. The Supreme Court
found New York's eavesdropping statute to be unconstitutional as it was "too broad in its sweep
[and] result[ed] in a trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." Berger, 388 U.S. at
44.
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Id. at 353.
28. On this issue, the legislative history specifically states that "[t]his proposed legislation
conforms to the constitutional standards set out in Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States." S.
REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113 (citations omitted).
29. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 507 (1974).
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simultaneously articulating when law enforcement may intercept such
communications. 3 °
The Supreme Court provided an overview of the way in which
wiretaps are authorized under the federal wiretap statute in its decision in
United States v. Giordano:
Judicial wiretap orders must be preceded by applications containing
prescribed information. The judge must make certain findings be-
fore authorizing interceptions, including the existence of probable
cause. The orders themselves must particularize the extent and na-
ture of the interceptions that they authorize, and they expire within a
specified time unless expressly extended by a judge based on fur-
ther application by enforcement officials. Judicial supervision of the
progress of the interception is provided for, as is official control of
the custody of any recordings or tapes produced by the interceptions
carried out pursuant to the order. 31
In addressing this detailed procedure for obtaining a valid wiretap,
the Supreme Court also noted that wiretaps are not available in all cases
or as an initial method of investigation.32 With respect to these limita-
tions, the Court wrote the following:
The Act ... not only limits the crimes for which intercept authority
may be obtained but also imposes important preconditions to ob-
taining any intercept authority at all. Congress ... evinced the clear
intent to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used with
restraint and only where the circumstances warrant the surreptitious
interception of wire and oral communications. These procedures
were not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal in-
vestigation. Rather, the applicant must state and the court must find
that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dan-
33gerous.
Finally, the Supreme Court pointed out that under Title III, wiretaps
can only be requested by certain specified persons:
The Act plainly calls for the prior, informed judgement of enforce-
ment officers desiring court approval for intercept authority, and in-
vestigative personnel may not themselves ask a judge for authority
to wiretap or eavesdrop. The mature judgement of a particular, re-
30. Rahavy, supra note 21, at 88 (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41,48 (1972)).
31. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 514-15.
32. Id. at 515.
33. Id.
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sponsible Department of Justice official is interposed as a critical
precondition to any judicial order. 34
In addressing these detailed procedural requirements, the Supreme
Court has held that strict compliance with the procedures set forth in the
statute is required for a wiretap to be considered lawful.
35
b. The Civil, Criminal, and Evidentiary Penalties
Associated with Violating Title III
Title III violations stemming from one person recording another
person's telephone conversations can result in the imposition of criminal,
civil, and evidentiary penalties against the violator. On the issue of pen-
alties, the legislative history stresses that the prohibitions of Title III"must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions., 36 In addressing these
"sanctions" the legislative history reads as follows: "Criminal penalties
have their part to play. But other remedies must be afforded the victim of
an unlawful invasion of privacy. Provision must be made for civil re-
course for dangers. The perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his
unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings., 37 "Each of these ob-
jectives," the drafters concluded, "is sought by the proposed legisla-
tion. ' 31
With respect to criminal penalties, Title III provides that "whoever
violates [the prohibition against intercepting the specified communica-
tions] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both., 39 The issue of civil penalties is slightly more complex.
The statute provides that "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in viola-
tion of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or en-
tity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such
relief as may be appropriate. 4a In defining what "relief' may be appro-
priate, the law provides that "appropriate relief includes: (1) such pre-
liminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;
(2) [actual or statutory damages] and punitive damages in appropriate
34. Id. at 515-16.
35. See id. at 527 ("[W]e think Congress intended to require suppression where there is failure
to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congres-
sional intention to limit the use of the intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative device.").
36. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (4)(a) (2000)
40. Id. § 2520(a).
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cases; and (3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs rea-
sonably incurred."41 Finally, any evidence obtained during a wiretap
made in violation of Title lII is not admissible in a criminal or civil trial,
or in a number of other types of hearings:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chap-
ter.42
These three distinct types of penalties are independent of one an-
other such that any person who violates Title III can potentially be sub-
ject to all three types of penalties for a single violation of the law. 43 At
the same time, however, they also work in conjunction with one another
to "form ... an integral part of the system of limitations designed to pro-
tect privacy ' 44 and "serve to ... curtail the unlawful interception of wire
and oral communications.
c. The One-Party Consent Exception
As stated above, Title III prohibits "all interceptions of oral and
wire communications, except those specifically provided for in the
Act.",4 6 One important exception-the exception at issue in cases involv-
ing the doctrine of vicarious consent-is the one-party consent excep-
tion. In brief, the one-party consent exception holds that if one party to a
communication consents to a recording of that communication, there is
no violation of Title III: 4 1
41. Id. § 2520(b). The law provides that the complaining party can collect statutory or actual
damages but not both.
In [an] action under this section [that does not involve the private viewing of an un-
scrambled private satellite video communication or an unscrambled radio communica-
tion] the court may assess damages whichever is the greater of-(A) the sum of the actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the
violation; or (B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day
of violation or $10,000.
Id. § 2520(c)(2).
42. Id. § 2515.
43. S. REP. NO. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2000).
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It shall not be unlawful ... for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such inter-
ception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States or of any State.48
Under this important exception, as stated above, one participant in a
"wire, oral, or electronic communication" can record the communication
without violating Title III. 49 So too can a third party who has been given
prior consent by one of the parties to the conversation. 50 Significantly,
the statute does not require that the person making the recording notify
the other participants that a recording is being made or that the conversa-
tion is being intercepted. 51
3. The Federal Wiretap Statute & Domestic Wiretapping
The doctrine of vicarious consent, as will be discussed more fully,
is a legal doctrine that addresses a parent's ability to intercept a child's
telephone conversations-a type of domestic wiretapping-without vio-
lating Title 111.52 Yet, the language of the federal wiretap statute does not
expressly address the applicability or nonapplicability of Title III to do-
mestic or interfamily wiretap situations.53 This omission has led to some
confusion in the application of Title III. Since its passage, and even dur-
ing the time that Congress debated its enactment, legislators, courts, and
commentators have argued about whether the federal wiretap statute ap-
plies in domestic or interfamily wiretapping situations, including situa-
tions involving parent-child wiretapping. 54 These debates have resulted
48. id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See infra Part II.B. 1.
53. Deana A. Labriola, Comment, Parent-Child Wiretapping: Is Title 111 Enough?, 50 CATH.
U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2001).
54. One author summarized the positions of both sides as follows:
Despite its roots in combating organized crime, some commentators argue that Congress
intended that the Act include domestic wiretapping within its purview. These commenta-
tors cite Congress's failure to make any exception for domestic wiretapping as support
for this proposition. In addition, Professor Robert Blakey, widely recognized as the au-
thor of the Federal Wiretapping Statute, was concerned that the Act as first drafted was
deficient in that it relied on the Commerce Clause, and would therefore fail to protect in-
dividuals from wiretapping resulting from marital litigation. Congress's subsequent revi-
sion of the Statute to include a different constitutional justification can be seen as evi-
dence of its intent that the Act reach domestic communications, in addition to those of
2005]
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in a circuit split on the issue, with two federal circuits holding that inter-
family wiretapping is outside the reach of the statute and its penalties,
while four circuits have held that the law prohibits both domestic and
nondomestic wiretapping alike.55 More succinctly put, "the general ap-
plicability of the Wiretap Act in the domestic realm remains unclear., 56
This is a problem because, according to some estimates, "nearly 80 per-
cent of reported wiretapping matters involve wiretaps within the family
context.,
57
organized crime. Furthermore, several senators spoke of the problem of domestic wire-
tapping during the debates on the Right of Privacy Act, the early version of the Statute.
Senator Long, for one, stated that the three largest areas of snooping in the nongovern-
mental field included "(1) industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics." Other senators
also spoke of the broad prohibition that the Statute placed upon wiretapping in areas such
as domestic relations.
However, one can also argue that the record from hearings before the House Judici-
ary Committee reflects an additional intent to allow for a certain degree of parental
wiretapping. For example, Professor Herman Schwartz, testifying before the House,
stated that "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teen-
age daughter or some such related problem." Courts have since interpreted this to mean
that Congress did not mean to subject parents to civil and criminal penalties for recording
their children's phone calls out of concern for their child's well-being.
Julieann Karkosak, Note, Tapping into Family Affairs: Examining the Federal Wiretapping Statute
As It Applies to the Home, Pollock v. Pollock, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 995, 999-1000 (2000) (citations
omitted). See also Labriola, supra note 53, at 447-53.
55. The two circuits that have found interspousal wiretapping to be outside the purview of Title
II are the Second and Fifth circuits. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 677 (2nd Cir.
1977) ("[W]e... assume that 'nobody wants to make it a crime' for a father to listen in on conversa-
tions between his wife and his eight year old daughter, from his own phone, in his own home. The
fact that appellee here taped the conversations which he permissibly overheard, we find ... to be a
distinction without a difference."); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[W]e
are of the opinion that Congress did not intend [to have Title III extend] into areas normally left to
states, those of the marital home and domestic conflicts."). Those which have reached a contrary
finding include the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth circuits. See Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537, 1539
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he district court below held that Title Ill ... does apply to interspousal wire-
taps. We agree with the district court, and join the majority of federal circuit courts in holding that
Title Ill does provide a remedy for such wiretapping."); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374
(4th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e find that Title Ill prohibits all wiretapping activities unless specifically ex-
cepted. There is no express exception for instances of willful, unconsented to electronic surveillance
between spouses. Nor is there any indication in the statutory language or in the legislative history
that Congress intended to imply an exception to facts involving interspousal wiretapping."); United
States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he plain language of the section and the Act's
legislative history compels interpretation of the statute to include interspousal wiretaps.").
56. Rahavy, supra note 21, at 87.
57. Allan H. Zerman & Cary J. Mogerman, Wiretapping and Divorce: A Survey and Analysis
of the Federal and State Laws Relating To Electronic Eavesdropping and Their Application in Mat-
rimonial Cases, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 227, 228 (1994). For additional discussion on the
issue of whether there exists an interspousal exception to the federal wiretap statute from the stand-
point of one who believes that there is no such exception, see Scott J. Glick, Is Your Spouse Taping
Your Telephone Calls?: Title III and Interspousal Electronic Surveillance, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 845
(1992).
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4. State Wiretap Statutes
In addition to being subject to the federal wiretap statute and its
prohibitions and procedures, all but one of the fifty states have enacted
their own wiretapping laws to govern the recording of telephone and
58other conversations. With respect to a consent exception to the prohibi
tion against recording telephone and other communications, a significant
number of state wiretap statutes follow the federal model and contain a
one-party consent exception.5 9 For example, Ohio's wiretap statute is
58. The state wiretap statutes are codified in the following locations: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§
13A-11-31 to -33 (2005)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (Michie 2005)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3005 (2005)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (Michie 2005)); California (CAL.
PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2005)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-303 (2005)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189 (2005)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (2005)); District
of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-542 (2005)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. 934.03 (West 2005));
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (2005)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-42 (2005)); Idaho
(IDAHO CODE § 18-6702 (Michie 2005)); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2005)); Indiana
(IND. CODE § 35-33.5-5-5 (2005)); Iowa (IOWA CODE §§ 727.8, 808B.2 (2005)); Kansas (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (2005)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (Banks-Baldwin 2005));
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 2005)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
710 (West 2005)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (2005)); Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(c)(1) (2005)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (2005));
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 626A.02 (2005)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-533 (2005));
Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 542-402 (West 2005)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213
(2005)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-290 (2005)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.620
(2005)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2005)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:156A-3 (2005)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (Michie 2005)); New York (N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 250.05 (2005)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2005)); North Dakota
(N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (2005)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West 2005));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 176.3 (2005)); Oregon (OR. REV, STAT. § 165.543 (2005)); Penn-
sylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (2005)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21
(2005)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (Law. Co-op. 2005)); South Dakota (S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (Michie 2005)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (2005));
Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon 2005)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-403
(2005)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (2005)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030
(2005)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-3 (2005)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2005));
and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702 (Michie 2005)). Vermont is the only state that has not
adopted its own state wiretapping statute. There are some protections in place in that state, however,
as the Vermont Supreme Court has held that the surreptitious electronic monitoring of communica-
tions within a person's home is an unlawful invasion of privacy. See generally Vermont v. Geraw,
795 A.2d 1219 (Vt. 2002); Vermont v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552 (Vt. 1991).
For more information on the various state wiretapping statutes, see generally Stacy L. Mills,
Note, He Wouldn 't Listen To Me Before, But Now ... : Interspousal Wiretapping and an Analysis of
State Wiretapping Statutes, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (1998).
59. Specifically, those states that have adopted a one-party consent exception similar to that
contained in Title III are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Gary L. Bostwick & Jean-Paul Jassy,
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similar to the federal statute. Under Ohio law, it is illegal for any person
to "[i]ntercept, attempt to intercept, or procure another person to inter-
cept or attempt to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.
60
The law, however, includes a one-party consent exception:
This section does not apply to ... [a] person ... who intercepts a
wire, oral, or electronic communication, if the person is a party to
the communication or if one of the parties to the communication has
given the person prior consent to the interception, and if the com-
munication is not intercepted for the purpose of committing a
criminal offense or tortious act ... or for the purpose of committing
61any other injurious act.
Similar to the federal statute, Ohio law provides for civil remedies
against those who violate its wiretap statute.62 Texas also provides for a
one-party consent exception:
A person commits an offense if the person ... intentionally inter-
cepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures another person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication..
. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution... [that] the person is
a party to the communication or if one of the parties to the commu-
63nication has given prior consent to the interception.
Under this code section, which provides an affirmative defense in
the form of a one-party consent requirement, it is a criminal offense to
make an unauthorized interception of another person's wire, oral, or
other electronic communication.
64
Since Title III's passage, courts have held that states may adopt
wiretap laws that are more stringent than federal law, but states "may not
adopt standards that are less restrictive." 65 As such, while most states
Flanagan 's Wake: Newsgatherers Navigate Uncertain Waters Following Flanagan v. Flanagan, 23
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 10 n.51 (2002).
60. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(A)(1) (2005).
61. § 2933.52(B)(4).
62. With respect to civil damages, Ohio law provides that "[a] person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communications are intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation [of Ohio law]
may bring a civil action to recover from the person or entity that engaged in the violation any relief
that may be appropriate." § 2933.65(A).
63. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 16.02(b), (c)(3)(a) (2005).
64. See § 1602(b).
65. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 834 (Mass. 1975); see also People v. Conklin,
522 P.2d 1049, 1057 (Cal. 1974) ("The legislative history of Title III reveals that Congress intended
that the states be allowed to enact more restrictive laws designed to protect the right of privacy ...
The State statute must meet the Minimum standards reflected as a whole in [Title 1II. If it does so,
then the State] would be free to adopt More restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less
restrictive legislation. In other words, Congress left room for the states to supplement the law in
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have adopted one-party consent exceptions to their wiretap statutes, a
small handful of states have adopted a more stringent form of the statute,
one which requires the consent of both parties to a conversation before it
can be lawfully recorded.66 California's statute provides a good example
of this two-party consent requirement:
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all par-
ties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic...
recording device, eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential com-
munication ... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thou-
sand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one y'ear, or in the state prison, or by both that
fine and imprisonment.
Under California's statutory scheme, more severe penalties apply
when a person has a prior conviction for wiretap violations. 68 Civil pen-
alties are also available to those persons "injured by a violation" of Cali-
fornia's wiretap law.69
As it has developed, the vicarious consent doctrine is available only
in those jurisdictions that enact one-party consent exceptions. The doc-
trine is only applicable in these specific jurisdictions because its sole
purpose, as discussed below, is to allow a parent or guardian to record a
child's telephone conversations without the child or, in particular, the
person with whom the child is speaking, becoming aware of the intercep-
tion; necessarily, it is made without the consent of the party to whom the
child is speaking. v
certain areas, provided the regulations are not more permissive.") (italics added); United States v.
Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863 n.3 (lst Cir. 1987) ("Generally speaking ... states are free to superimpose
more rigorous requirements upon those mandated by the Congress, but not to water down federally-
devised safeguards.") (citations omitted). Under this standard, it is possible that evidence admissible
in federal court could be excluded in state court under a more restrictive wiretap law. For a discus-
sion of the differences among the various state wiretap statutes, see Mills, supra note 58, at 4129.
66. States adopting a more stringent law include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See
James A. Pautler, You Know More Than You Think, State v. Townsend, Imputed Knowledge and
Implied Consent Under the Washington Privacy Act, 28 SEA. U. L. REV. 209, 211 n. 18 (2004). Addi-
tionally, while Nevada's state statute does not require the consent of all parties to a conversation, the
Nevada Supreme Court has held that such consent is necessary. See generally Lane v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 969 P.2d 938 (Nev. 1998).
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
68. See id.
69. § 637.2 ("Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an
action against the person who committed the violation for the greater of the following amounts: (1)
Five thousand dollars ($5,000). (2) Three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by
the plaintiff.").
70. See infra Part lI.B.2.a.
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B. Parental Recording of a Minor Child's Telephone
Conversations and the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent
The doctrine of vicarious consent, a legal doctrine created by judi-
cial decision, addresses a parent's ability to consent to a recording of a
child's telephone communications on the child's behalf, without running
afoul of federal or state wiretap laws. This section addresses the princi-
ples underlying the doctrine, its specific development over the last dec-
ade, and the response that critics of the doctrine have made to its accep-
tance by a small handful of state and federal courts.
1. The Doctrine of Vicarious Consent and Its Underlying Principles
The basic premise of the doctrine of vicarious consent is that a par-
ent can avoid liability for violations of the federal wiretap statute or its
state law counterparts that might otherwise attach when he or she surrep-
titiously records a minor child's telephone conversations with a third
party without gaining prior consent from the child or the third party. As
stated above, the federal and state wiretap statutes generally prohibit
such recordings. 71 However, under the doctrine of vicarious consent, the
parent is deemed to have vicariously consented to the interception and
recording of a conversation on behalf of the minor child. As such, the
recording is therefore considered to be one to which one of the parties to
the conversation-specifically the minor child-has consented, thereby
satisfying the one-party consent exception and protecting the parents
from civil or criminal liability.72
The doctrine of vicarious consent is not codified in Title III, but
was created by judicial decision.7 3 As such, the doctrine's details are
found in those state and federal decisions that have accepted the concept
of vicarious consent in the context of the one-party consent exception.
The most fundamental requirement, as explained below, is that the parent
who records the conversation must do so under a good faith and reason-
able belief that he or she is acting in the child's best interest. 4
2. The Cases Through Which the Doctrine Has Developed
The doctrine of vicarious consent has slowly developed over the
last decade as courts have adjudicated cases that, in one way or another,
involve a parent who has surreptitiously recorded one or more of a minor
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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child's telephone conversations with either the other parent or a third
party.7 5 To date, the majority of courts to address the issue have done so
in the context of either custody disputes or civil tort claims for alleged
violations of the federal wiretap statute arising from custody disputes. 76
A small handful of criminal courts have also addressed the issue, all in
the context of a parent recording a child's telephone conversations with a
third-party adult who is not a member of the immediate family.7 7 Of
these criminal courts, some have adopted the doctrine of vicarious con-
sent and have further allowed prosecutors to use the recorded conversa-
tions at the trial of one of the parties to the conversation.7 8 Other courts,
however, have rejected the doctrine and therefore have not allowed such
a use of the recordings.7 9
a. The Development of the Concept of Vicarious Consent
The first court to present and address the issue of vicarious consent
was the United States District Court for the District of Utah in the 1993
case of Thompson v. Dulaney.80 Thompson arose out of a custody dispute
between the parents of two young children. 81 While the divorce and cus-
tody issues underlying the case were adjudicated in Utah state court,
James Thompson, the noncustodial parent, filed suit in federal court al-
leging that the custodial parent, Denise Dulaney, had violated various
portions of Title 111.82 Specifically, Thompson alleged that Dulaney ille-
gally tape recorded conversations between Thompson and his children
during the pendency of the aforementioned divorce and custody proceed-
ings.83 Dulaney freely admitted that she had taped Thompson's conversa-
tions with their children-the conversations were even used as evidence
in the custody dispute-but argued that it was not illegal for her to do so
because Thompson "was interfering with her relationship with the chil-
dren to whom she was awarded custody., 84 Dulaney further argued that
she was within her rights to record the conversations because she needed
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah 1993).
81. Id. at 1537.
82. Id. at 1537-38.
83. Id. ("[Thompson] sought several million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages"
from a handful of individuals, including his ex-wife, her parents, and her attorneys for the alleged
wiretap.).
84. Id. at 1544.
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to monitor and document that interference in order to effectively and ap-
propriately protect her children.85
The court's creation and discussion of the doctrine of vicarious
consent arose in the context of a ruling on Dulaney's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 86 In what the court itself described as a "very narrow
[holding] limited to the particular facts of this case, 87 it held the follow-
ing:
[A]s long as the guardian has a good faith basis that is objectively
reasonable for believing that it is necessary to consent on behalf of
her minor children to the taping of the phone conversations, vicari-
ous consent will be permissible in order for the guardian to fulfill
her statutory mandate to act in the best interests of the child.88
Noting that the case presented a "unique legal question of first im-
pression," 89 the court recognized the existence of a right of vicarious
consent in the case before it because of its concerns regarding parents'
ability to protect very young children "who lack both the capacity to con-
sent and the ability to give actual consent." 90 It further noted the follow-
ing: "In this case, or perhaps a more extreme example of a parent who
was making abusive or obscene phone calls threatening or intimidating
85. Id. at 1542.
86. The opinion in which the district court developed the concept of vicarious consent was
actually its second ruling on the motion. See Thompson v. Dulaney, No. 2:90CV00676 (Docket) (D.
Utah Aug. 15, 1990), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992). In
1991, upon remand, the district court ruled that the case was outside the purview of Title Ill because
it was purely a domestic conflict. See Thompson, 970 F.2d at 746. That holding was later reversed in
part and Denise Dulaney was given another chance to go forward with her motion. Id. at 750.
87. Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544. In addressing the narrowness of its holding, the court
emphasized more than once that its holding was very fact-specific:
It is by no means intended to establish a sweeping precedent regarding vicarious consent
under any and all circumstances. The holding of this case is clearly driven by the fact that
this case involves two minor children whose relationship with their mother/guardian was
allegedly being undermined by their father. Under these limited circumstances, the Court
concludes that vicarious consent is permissible.
Id. at 1544 n.8. One important fact that the court alludes to above in reaching its holding is the age of
the children whose conversations were being recorded. It wrote:
The children in this case were ages three and five. They clearly lacked legal capacity to
consent, and they could not, in any meaningful sense, have given actual consent, either
express or implied, since they were incapable of understanding the nature of consent and
of making a truly voluntary decision to consent.
Id. at 1543. Based on these and other statements contained in the opinion, it is arguable that the
Thompson court would not be as liberal in the application of the vicarious consent doctrine to other
fact scenarios.
88. Id. at 1544.
89. Id. at 1543.
90. Id.
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minor children, vicarious consent is necessary to enable the guardian to
protect the children from further harassment .. ..",91 Protection of a
young child, the court concluded, is the reason that the principle of "vi-
carious consent is necessary., 92
In holding as it did, the court stressed the importance of divining
parental motivations. 93 In ruling on Dulaney's motion for summary
judgment, the court wrote that whether or not Dulaney would be permit-
ted to rely on the vicarious consent exception "requires a factual resolu-
tion of what Denise Dulaney's 'purpose' was in intercepting the commu-
nication. 94 The court later added that "the viability of the consent de-
fense is contingent on a resolution of [Dulaney's] purpose in intercepting
these communications. 9 5 Because it determined that there existed factual
issues regarding Denise Dulaney's motivation, the court, while accepting
the principle of vicarious consent, denied Dulaney's motion for summary
judgment.9 6
After the district court handed down its ruling in Thompson v. Du-
laney, the doctrine of vicarious consent was reshaped in subsequent court
rulings from myriad jurisdictions. One such ruling came from the Court
of Civil Appeals of Alabama in its 1996 decision in Silas v. Silas,97
which involved a father who made recordings of telephone conversations
between his child and the child's mother.98 In Silas the court referenced
Thompson and adopted that court's reasoning, while issuing a slightly
narrower holding:99
The tapes were subsequently produced to and listened to by the
guardian ad litem and the court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Karl
Kirkland. Dr. Kirkland testified that the tapes showed verbal abuse
of the minor child by the mother and that the verbal abuse was dam-
aging to the minor child.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the father had a good faith
basis that was objectively reasonable for believing that the minor
91. Id. at 1544.
92. Id.
93. Thompson, 838 F. Supp. at 1544.
94. Id. at 1545.
95. Id. On this point the court further stated that any determination of whether or not a parent
or guardian "has a good faith basis ... for believing that it is necessary to consent on behalf of [a]
minor [child]" is a question of fact that can only be decided after the presentation of evidence on the
issue. Id.
96. Id. at 1545, 1548.
97. 680 So.2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
98. Id. at 369.
99. Id. at 370-71.
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child was being abused, threatened, or intimidated by the mother;
therefore it was permissible for the father to vicariously consent on
behalf of the minor child to the taping of the telephone conversa-
tions.100
While it is not fully clear, the holding in Silas appears to potentially
narrow the application of the doctrine to situations in which there is a
good faith basis for believing that the child is "being abused, threatened,
or intimidated" by the other parent. 101 In Thompson there was no such
specific limitation, but only a general statement of reasonable parental
concern for the child's best interests. 102
Another major court decision on the vicarious consent doctrine was
the Sixth Circuit's ruling in the case of Pollock v. Pollock,'°3 the first
federal appellate-level court to address the doctrine. Pollock arose from a
civil suit filed by Samuel Pollock alleging that his ex-wife Sandra vio-
lated the federal wiretap statute by tape recording a number of conversa-
tions that took place, over a few weeks' time, between their daughter
Courtney and Samuel and his new wife, conversations that "occurred in
the context of a bitter and protracted custody dispute."'' 0 4 Neither Samuel,
his new wife, nor Courtney consented to the recordings. 10 5 Sandra justi-
fied the recordings by arguing that "she 'believed that Courtney was be-
ing subject to emotional and psychological pressure by Samuel and Sam-
uel's wife, Laura, whereby Samuel was trying to get Courtney to do
whatever she could to convince [Sandra] to let Courtney primarily live
with Samuel."",10 6 Sandra further claimed that her sole motivation in re-
cording her daughter's telephone conversations with her father was San-
dra's concern for Courtney's well-being. 10 7 Samuel, as expected, argued
that Sandra had a different motivation-retaliation. 10 8 Specifically, he
argued that "Sandra was angry that Courtney had taped a conversation
between herself and Sandra with Samuel and Laura's consent, and'wanted to return the favor by taping Courtney's conversations with Sam
and [Laura]." ' 10 9 After Samuel filed suit, Sandra filed a motion to dis-
100. Id. at 371-72.
101. Id. at 371.
102. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
103. 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 603.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 604.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id.
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miss, which the court treated as a summary judgment motion. 110 The dis-
trict court granted Sandra's motion, and Samuel appealed."'
In ruling on the aforementioned dispute, the Sixth Circuit accepted
and then expanded the reach of the doctrine of vicarious consent as set
forth in Thompson:" 2
After [a] review of relevant case law, we ... agree with the district
court's adoption of the [vicarious consent] doctrine, provided that a
clear emphasis is put on the need for the "consenting" parent to
demonstrate a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing
such consent was necessary for the welfare of the child. Accord-
ingly, we adopt the standard set forth by the district court in Thomp-
son and hold that as long as the guardian has a good faith, objec-
tively reasonable basis for believing that it is necessary and in the
best interest of the child to consent on behalf of his or her minor
child to the taping of telephone conversations, the guardian may vi-
cariously consent on behalf of the child to the recording. Such vi-
carious consent will be exempt from liability under Title III, pursu-
ant to the consent exception contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d)." 3
As stated above, in holding as it does, the Sixth Circuit expands the
reach of the vicarious consent doctrine beyond that set forth in Thomp-
son.114 Specifically, the Pollock court held that the doctrine applies not
only to young children, but also to children much older than those in-
volved in Thompson." 5 The children caught in the middle of Thompson
were three and five-a fact to which the Thompson court attached great
significance. 16 In Pollock, however, the child whose telephone conversa-
tions were secretly recorded was fourteen years of age.' 7
In expanding the application of the doctrine of vicarious consent to
include older children, the court seemingly does away with the Thomp-
son court's staunch reliance on the fact that the children at issue in that
case "were children who 'lack[ed] both the capacity to [legally] consent
and the ability to give actual consent."'1 18 In so doing, it relied on its own
district court's decision: "[W]e are not inclined to view [the child's] own
110. Pollock, 154 F.3d at 605.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 610.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 608.
117. Id. at 604.
118. Id. at 608 (quoting Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Utah 1993)) (al-
teration in original).
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ability to actually consent as mutually exclusive with her mother's ability
to consent on her behalf."'" 9 Furthermore, with respect to the issue of
age: "It would be problematic ...for the Court to attempt to limit the
application of the doctrine to children of a certain age, as not all children
develop emotionally and intellectually on the same timetable, and we
decline to do so."12°  In short, Pollock expanded the doctrine's applicabil-
ity to a greater number of people by refusing to limit it to cases involving
very young children.' 2 1
Though its holding expands the number of children to which the
doctrine applies, the court does issue a warning to would-be wiretappers,
writing that "[w]e stress that.., this doctrine should not be interpreted as
permitting parents to tape any conversation involving their child simply
by invoking the magic words: 'I was doing it in his/her best interest." ,122
Instead, the court stresses, recognition and acceptance of the vicarious
consent doctrine requires "that a clear emphasis [be] put on the need for
the 'consenting' parent to demonstrate a good faith, objectively reason-
able basis for believing that such consent was necessary for the welfare
of the child.', 123
In addition to their acceptance of the vicarious consent doctrine, the
Thompson, Silas, and Pollock decisions all share a significant factual
similarity-they all involve one parent who recorded conversations be-
tween a child and the other parent. More specifically, none of the three
decisions addresses the issue of a parent who records a child's telephone
conversations with a third party who is not a family member. It was not
until the criminal courts began to accept the vicarious consent doctrine
that recordings involving nonfamily members began to appear as part of
the case law governing the doctrine.
119. Id. (citing Pollock v. Pollock, 975 F. Supp. 974, 978 n.2 (W.D. Ky. 1997)).
120. Id. at 610.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In addition to Thompson, Silas, and Pollock, a handful of other courts have accepted
the doctrine of vicarious consent. Other civil cases include Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186,
1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("To be entitled to summary judgment, Mr. Price's intercepting the telephone
conversations must have been founded upon a good faith belief that, to advance the child's best
interests, it was necessary to consent on behalf of his minor child.") and Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E.2d
760, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("While our courts have not addressed this issue, federal courts con-
struing the Omnibus Act have considered and adopted the 'vicarious consent doctrine.' . . . As we
find the reasoning of these cases persuasive, we adopt the vicarious consent doctrine with respect to
our Electronic Surveillance Act ... as long as the parent: has a good faith, objectively reasonable
belief that the interception of [the] conversations is necessary for the best interests of the child[.]")
(citations omitted). See also Stinson v. Larson, 893 So. 2d 462 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (holding a
mother's recording of a minor child's telephone conversations with father as proper under the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act).
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b. The Doctrine of Vicarious Consent in the Criminal Context
A small number of reported cases have carried the doctrine of vi-
carious consent from the civil to the criminal arena, allowing for the use
of recorded telephone conversations in the prosecution of an adult crimi-
nally charged, in one way or another, with victimizing a child. 24 The
typical scenario in these cases involves parental taping of a conversation
between a child and a nonfamily member who is later discovered to be
sexually abusing the child, and a subsequent legal challenge to the use of
those recordings in the prosecution of the abuser. 25
The case of Commonwealth v. Barboza126 provides a good example
of the way in which courts have applied the doctrine of vicarious consent
in the context of these criminal prosecutions. Barboza, a criminal prose-
cution, involved allegations that George Barboza had sexually molested a
young boy named Tom, the son of one of Barboza's employees. 27 Ini-
tially Barboza and Tom's family had little contact, but in 1993 Tom's
family moved to the town where Barboza lived. 28 At that point, the
families "began meeting frequently, and on some weekends, Tom would
stay overnight with [Barboza] at his home."'' 2 9 Tom also spent time with
Barboza at Barboza's second home in Florida during February of
1995.130
Tom's relationship with Barboza continued to develop, and in 1996
Tom's parents "began to feel uneasy about their son's close relationship"
with Barboza. 13 1 Specifically, during 1996, Tom's family visited Barboza
in Florida.' 32 During that visit Tom "had little interaction with his par-
ents;" furthermore, Tom "stayed in one hotel room with [Barboza], while
his parents and their other son stayed in a second room."'' 33 As the court's
opinion illustrates, the relationship continued to develop after the vaca-
tion:
[Tom's parents] were further disconcerted when Tom announced
that it was his intention after he graduated from high school to live
124. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) and cases
cited infra note 155.
125. See, e.g., Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 547; State v. Morrison, 56 P.3d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002).
126. 763 N.E.2d at 547.
127. Id. at 550.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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with [Barboza] in Florida. After the family returned from Florida in
December, 1996, [Barboza] called Tom on a regular basis. The par-
ents noticed that when Tom spoke with [Barboza] on the telephone,
he would be unusually quiet, and sometimes even denied afterwards
that he had spoken to [Barboza].13
4
Determining that things had gone far enough, Tom's parents de-
cided to investigate Barboza's relationship with their son. 135 To this end,
"Tom's father ordered a tape recorder that he had seen advertised in a
magazine in order to record secretly telephone conversations at his
house.', 136 Tom's parents never told their sons that the tape recorder had
been installed, and thereafter "[flour telephone calls between Tom and
[Barboza] were recorded."1 37 In each of these conversations, the court
wrote, Barboza "declared that he loved Tom, and in at least the last three
conversations, there [were] references to masturbation.' ' 138 Additionally,
in the second of the recorded telephone calls Barboza mentioned "mak-
ing love" with Tom.' 39
Upon discovering that Barboza was having sexual contact with his
son, Tom's father turned the recordings over to law enforcement and
criminal charges were filed against Barboza.140 During the course of
Barboza's trial, and following a partial denial of a motion to suppress the
recordings, the prosecution was permitted to play two of the recordings
to the jury, which ultimately convicted Barboza of four counts of rape of
a child under sixteen and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a
child under fourteen.' 4 1 In ruling on the suppression issue, the judge
stated that "[t]here's no question ... that the [parents'] primary concern
was their son and that everything they did was not to assist law enforce-
ment..., but to try to figure out what was going on and what's right for
their son and for their family.' 42 Because it found that the recordings
were made out of a concern for family rather than a desire to assist law
enforcement, the court concluded that two of the four recordings-both
made prior to law enforcement being informed of the situation-were
134. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 550.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 550-51.
141. Id. at 549-50 In addition to the taped evidence, Tom, the victim, also testified and told the
jury about "numerous acts of indecent touching, and oral and anal sex committed by [Barboza]." Id.
142. Id. at 551.
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admissible at trial. 143 The other two recordings, made after police were
contacted, though not at their request, were suppressed because "under
the circumstances, silence by the police made the parents unwitting
agents of the police for the purposes of continuing to record telephone
calls from [Barboza].' On appeal, Barboza argued that the trial court
should have suppressed the two tape recordings the jury had heard, as
well as other evidence that he alleged was obtained after the recordings
were made and provided to law enforcement. 145 The Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court divided its discussion of Barboza's claim into two distinct
parts. The first was an analysis of the suppression issues under the Mas-
sachusetts state wiretap statute, 46 and the second was a similar analysis
under the federal wiretap law. 14 7
The court began its analysis under the Massachusetts statute by ap-
propriately pointing out that Massachusetts is a two-party consent state,
meaning that "the Massachusetts wiretap statute.., requires both parties
to consent to the recording of telephone calls for the recording to be le-
gal." 48 As such, when Tom's father recorded Barboza's conversations
with Tom, which was done without Barboza's knowledge or consent, it
was clearly illegal under Massachusetts law. 149 This fact notwithstanding,
the appellate court determined that the trial court was correct in denying
Barboza's motion to suppress under the Massachusetts statute because it
was private conduct, not government conduct, that produced the re-
cordings that helped secure Barboza's rape and other convictions.' 50
Quoting the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Barboza court
noted that "[e]xclusionary rules generally are intended to deter future
police conduct in violation of constitutional or statutory rights,"' 15' and
determined that "we see no reason why the [exclusionary] rule should
protect [Barboza] from the consequences of the unlawful interception by
a private citizen, a father, acting in the privacy of his own home, without
any government involvement, to protect his child from sexual exploita-
tion."' 52
143. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 551.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 550.
146. Id. at 551-53.
147. Id. at 553-55.
148, Id. at 551.
149. See id.
150, Id. at 552-53.
151, Id. at 552 (quoting Commonwealth v. Santoro, 548 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Mass. 1990)).
152 Id. at 552-53.
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Of more pertinence to this article is the Barboza court's analysis of
the suppression issue under the federal wiretap statute. 53 With respect to
the application of federal law and the one-party consent exception con-
tained in Title III, the court, with very little discussion, concluded that "a
recording by parents of their own minor son talking on the telephone in
their own home, motivated by concerns that he was being sexually ex-
ploited by an adult, does not violate Title III.''54 In deciding the issue as
it does, the court briefly referenced the Sixth Circuit's decision in Pol-
lock as well as a handful of other cases that have approved the doctrine
of vicarious consent, and then relied on their authority to refute Bar-
boza's arguments. 155 Significantly, the court also went beyond the scope
153. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 553-54. Prior to analyzing the issue, the court briefly mentioned
the interplay between the federal and state wiretap laws:
"[A]lthough a State [wiretap] statute may adopt standards more stringent than the re-
quirements of Federal law, thus excluding from State courts evidence that would be ad-
missible in Federal courts, a State may not adopt standards that are less restrictive" and
would thereby allow evidence in State court that would be inadmissible in Federal court.
Id. at 553 (quoting Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (Mass. 1975)).
154. Id. at 554.
155. Id. at 553-54. The court also relied, in part, on another line of cases that approves of this
type of eavesdropping under the extension telephone exemption found in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i).
Id. As noted above, § 2511 (1)(b) provides that "any person who ... intentionally uses, endeavors to
use, or procures any other person to use ... any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept
any oral communication . . .shall be punished . . .or shall be subject to suit as provided in [the
Act]." With respect to this prohibition, § 2510(5)(a)(1) defines "electronic, mechanical, or other
device" as the following:
any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic commu-
nication other than any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic
communication service in the ordinary course of its business ... for connection to the fa-
cilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business.
§ 2510(5)(a)(i) (2000) (emphasis added). In short, then, the prohibition against wiretapping is not
violated when one records a conversation using an instrument that is connected to the phone and
used "in the ordinary course of... business"-hence the extension telephone exemption.
In addressing and explaining this exemption to the Act, the Barboza court wrote the following:
Other courts, focusing on their sense of "Congress's intention to abjure from deciding a
very intimate question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy family members
may expect within the home vis-A-vis each other" have relied on the extension telephone
exception . . . to uphold the introduction of evidence obtained through taping or eaves-
dropping within the family home. The extension telephone exception exempts from the
statute equipment, e.g., a second residential telephone, used by a telephone service sub-
scriber in the ordinary course of business. This exception has been read to permit mem-
bers within their own homes to eavesdrop on, and even record, each other.
Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 553-54 (citations omitted). The court then references a series of federal
court decisions that have adopted this extension telephone exemption. Id. See Janecka v. Franklin,
843 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1988); Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944
F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991).
2005] Wiretaps & Vicarious Consent
of Pollock and Thompson and noted that "we do not read the Federal
cases as limiting the parents' rights to intercept calls to those from family
members," meaning the court appears open to the idea that parents can
also record a child's telephone conversations with nonfamily members
under the doctrine of vicarious consent without running afoul of the pro-
hibitions of Title Ill.156
Not everyone who has encountered the extension telephone exemption and the way the courts
have interpreted it agrees that it is a viable exception to the prohibitions contained in Title Ill. One
author wrote the following:
While [the extension phone exception] is arguably consistent with Title Ill to permit lis-
tening in on an extension phone in the family home, most courts considered cases involv-
ing conduct that exceeds the mere use of an extension phone or other standard equipment.
Courts have tried to avoid the plain language of the telephone extension exemption by as-
serting that listening in on a telephone extension, recording a call, or installing a wiretap-
ping device is a "distinction without a difference." Yet, courts have recognized precisely
such differences in other contexts. Listening in on a telephone extension requires a
party's physical presence in the house and is limited to the length of the conversation. In
contrast, [installing a] recording or tapping devices is virtually unlimited and considera-
bly more intrusive.
Thus, while the extension phone exemption theoretically exempts a parent from Ti-
tle Ill liability, the exception, as expressly provided for in the statute, has not proven
highly relevant or logically sound in this context.
Rahavy, supra note 21, at 91 (citations omitted). Another commentator wrote the following:
Although there may be areas where the Pollock decision could be improved, in adopting
the vicarious consent doctrine rather than the extension phone exemption, the Sixth Cir-
cuit effectively rejected a clearly flawed doctrine. The first problem is that the extension
phone exemption rejects Congress's intent to include domestic situations within the pur-
view of the Federal Wiretapping Statute, and fails to truthfully acknowledge the meaning
of the language in the statute. An additional problem with the extension phone exemption
is the level of intrusion into privacy that it creates within the home.
Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1012. See also United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1396-1400 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that the recording mechanism (a tape recorder connected to extension
phones in Mrs. Murdock's home) does not qualify for the telephone extension (or business exten-
sion) exemption ... [S]pying on one's spouse does not constitute use of an extension phone in the
ordinary course of business."). For a more in-depth discussion of the extension telephone exemption,
see generally Karkosak, supra note 54.
One issue that the court did not address is the major difference between the extension tele-
phone exemption and the vicarious consent doctrine. Specifically, under the vicarious consent doc-
trine, a parent must have a reasonable and objective belief that recording the child's telephone con-
versation is in the child's best interest. See cases cited supra Part ll.B.2.a. There is no such require-
ment under the extension telephone exemption, which simply requires that the interception be made
from an extension telephone. See Rahavy, supra note 21, at 97.
156. Other criminal courts have recognized the doctrine as well. See, e.g., State v. Morrison, 56
P.3d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) ("If the parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for
believing that the recording of a child's telephone conversations is necessary and in the best interest
of the minor, the guardian may vicariously consent on behalf of the child to the recording without
violating Title Il1."); State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). In Diaz, the court
wrote:
In this case, parents of a nine-month old daughter hired defendant to work in their home
as a daytime nanny .... The parents became concerned about how defendant was treat-
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c. Rejecting the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent
Not all courts that have addressed the issue of parental taping of a
child's phone conversations have adopted the doctrine of vicarious con-
sent. A small number of courts have rejected the doctrine altogether and
held that parental recording of a child's phone conversations does not fall
within the consent exception to Title III or its state law equivalents.
The first court to raise and then reject the doctrine of vicarious con-
sent was the Michigan Court of Appeals in the case of Williams v. Wil-
liams.157 The Williams case, similar to Thompson v. Dulaney, involved an
appeal of a Michigan state trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment in a tort action filed by one former spouse against another. 158
Specifically, Brenda Williams filed suit against her former husband,
Brent Williams, when she discovered that he had secretly recorded some
telephone conversations that she had engaged in with their son, Jason
Williams, while Jason was living with Brent.159 Brenda Williams' three-
count lawsuit alleged violations of the federal wiretapping act and
Michigan's eavesdropping statute, and also included a claim based on the
common law tort of invasion of privacy.160 Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment in connection with the case. 161
In ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled
in favor of Brent Williams, holding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and that Brent had a right to consent to the recording of the
phone calls on behalf of his son. 162 In short, the trial court applied the
doctrine of vicarious consent. Brenda Williams appealed the lower
ing their daughter and physical evidence of bruises supported their concern. We hold that
[N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 2A:156A-4d incorporates the theory of vicarious consent and that,
under these circumstances, the audio portions of the [video] recording involving state-
ments to the child and the child's verbal reaction (as well as the video portion of the tape)
are admissible.
Id. at 270.
157. 581 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
158. Id. at 778.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the parties' arguments as follows:
Defendant Brent Williams, who had sole legal and physical custody of [the couple's
child] Jason at the time of the tape recording, argued that he had the authority to give
consent on Jason's behalf to the interception of the telephone conversations. Plaintiff
[Brenda Williams] posited that defendants' argument improperly expanded the scope of
the consent exceptions in the federal and state statutes and that a proper interpretation
would require summary disposition in her favor because defendant Brent Williams was
not a participant in the conversation.
Id.
162. Id.
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court's decision and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.163 In re-
versing the trial court, the appellate court addressed both the federal
wiretap statute and Michigan's eavesdropping statute. 64 In so doing, the
court framed the issue as follows:
The sole issue presented by plaintiff on appeal is an issue of
first impression for this Court: whether a custodial parent of a minor
child may consent on behalf of the child to the interception of con-
versations between the child and another party and thereby avoid li-
ability under the Michigan eavesdropping statute and the federal
wiretapping act. 165
The court further framed the issue in terms of statutory interpreta-
tion, writing that "we must decide whether these references to consent
may be construed so broadly as to include the type of vicarious consent
exception advocated by defendants." 16
6
As stated above, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and
in so doing, rejected the vicarious consent doctrine.167 With respect to the
applicability of the vicarious consent doctrine to the federal wiretapping
statute, the court rejected the doctrine because, contrary to the Utah Dis-
trict Court's decision in Thompson, the Michigan court chose to adopt a
narrow reading of the consent exception.'1 68 The court held as follows:
However, the federal wiretapping act is silent with regard to the
types of consent that Congress contemplated. The exception to the
federal statute simply provides for consent by "one of the parties to
the communication." This language gives us no indication that
Congress intended to create an exception for a custodial parent of a
minor child to consent on the child's behalf and tape record tele-
phone conversations between the child and a third party. Were it the
intent of Congress to create a safe harbor from liability for custodial
parents recording the conversations of their children, it, too, could
have easily done so. Instead, the federal wiretapping act states that
any exceptions to its prohibitions are "specifically provided in this
chapter." This Court will not speculate with regard to the probable
intent of Congress beyond the words expressed in the statute. 169
163. Id. at 778-79.
164. Id. at 779-80. Michigan's wiretap statute is found in Michigan Compiled Laws, section
750.539 (2005).
165. Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 778.
166. Id. at 779.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 780.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court then employed a similarly narrow reading of the state
statute, rejecting the vicarious consent doctrine because the state legisla-
ture had not specifically adopted it.' 70 In rejecting the doctrine, the court
also addressed decisions such as Thompson that accepted the doctrine,
holding that despite the benefits that it was able to provide, any accep-
tance of vicarious consent would be left to the state legislature. '71
The appellate court's rejection of the vicarious consent doctrine did
not end the appeals of the trial court's decision to adopt the doctrine.
Specifically, the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in Williams was
appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.' 72 The Michigan Supreme
Court did not decide the issue, but remanded the case back to the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Pollock, which the
Sixth Circuit decided after the Michigan appellate court initially rejected
the principle of vicarious consent. 73 On remand, the court reluctantly
held that, depending on the facts of the case, the vicarious consent doc-
trine potentially applied to the federal statute and the claim based on Ti-
tle 111.174 The court then remanded the case back to the trial court to make
a factual determination of whether vicarious consent excused Brent Wil-
liams' actions. 175 With respect to the state law claim, however, the court
held strong to its prior decision and rejected the claim of vicarious con-
sent:
170. The court wrote:
In the provisions of the Michigan eavesdropping statute, we find no indication that the
Michigan legislature intended to create an exception for a custodial parent of a minor
child to consent on the child's behalf to interceptions of conversations between the child
and a third party. If the Legislature had intended the result argued by defendants, then it
could have included such an exception in . . . the provision in the Michigan eavesdrop-
ping statute in which the Legislature delineated exceptions to the prohibition against
eavesdropping. Because the Legislature did not include such an exception, we must pre-
sume it intended only the meaning that it plainly expressed.
Id. at 779.
171. On this point, the court wrote:
Therefore, notwithstanding other courts' willingness to ascribe different meanings to the
consent exception, we decline to follow their lead. We instead commend to the legislative
branch the delicate question of the extent of privacy that family members may expect
within their home vis-A-vis each other. Unlike the judiciary, the legislative branch of
government is able to hold hearings and sort through the competing interests and policies
at stake.
Id. at 781.
172. Williams v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. 1999) (table decision).
173. Williams v. Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114, 115 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
174. Id. at 116 (stating that "we are bound to follow the Pollock holding with respect to the
federal question in this case").
175. Id.
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[T]his court is not compelled to follow federal precedent or guide-
lines in interpreting the Michigan eavesdropping statute. We remain
convinced by the statutory analysis in our prior opinion that if the
Legislature had intended [to allow a parent to vicariously consent
on behalf of a minor child to the recording of telephone conversa-
tions between the minor and a third party] then it could have in-
cluded such an exception in [the law]. 1'6
Thus the court held that the vicarious consent doctrine did not apply
in Michigan's state courts.1
7 7
The most recent rejection of the vicarious consent doctrine came
from the Washington Supreme Court in its 2004 decision in State v.
Christensen.71 In Christensen, the court addressed the admissibility of
evidence obtained by defendant Christensen's minor girlfriend's mother
during a surreptitious interception of a phone call between Christensen
and his girlfriend. 79
The Christensen case began when San Juan County Sheriff Bill
Cumming suspected Oliver Christensen of the robbery of an elderly
woman. 1 0 Because Sheriff Cumming "believed that evidence of the rob-
bery might be found in the house of Christensen's then-girlfriend, Lacey
Dixon," he contacted Lacey's mother, referred to by the court as Mrs.
Dixon, "and obtained her consent to search her home for evidence of the
crime."18 1 While no evidence was found in the home, Sheriff Cumming
nonetheless asked Mrs. Dixon to "keep a lookout for any evidence of the
crime that might surface."' 82 Mrs. Dixon did just that, and when Chris-
tensen later called for her daughter, she "handed the cordless handset to
her daughter, who took it upstairs into her bedroom and closed the door,"
and then Mrs. Dixon "activated the speakerphone function of the cord-
less telephone system."' 83 Thereafter, the court wrote, "Mrs. Dixon took
notes from the conversation she overheard, in which Christensen ac-
knowledged to Lacey that he was aware that police suspected him of the
robbery and that he knew the whereabouts of the purse, but not that he
had taken part in the robbery."' 84 Neither Lacey nor her boyfriend, Chris-
tensen, "knew of, or consented to, Mrs. Dixon listening to their conversa-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 153 Wash. 2d 186, 102 P.3d 789 (2004).
179. Id. at 191, 102 P.3d at 791.
180. Id. at 190, 102 P.3d at 790.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 190, 102 P.3d at 791.
184. Id.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
tion."' 85 At Christensen's trial, Mrs. Dixon was permitted to testify as to
the contents of the conversation that she had overheard. 186 That testi-
mony, in conjunction with other evidence, aided the prosecution in secur-
ing a conviction for second-degree robbery.' 87
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court addressed, among other
things, the State's assertion that the court should adopt the vicarious con-
sent doctrine and therefore find Mrs. Dixon's actions and her testimony
admissible.'88 Based on the fact that Washington's wiretap law requires
two-party consent before a lawful interception can occur, the court re-
jected the argument:
The State also suggests that there should be an implied exception to
the act in the case of minor children, arguing that children have a
reduced expectation of privacy because parents have an absolute
right to monitor all telephone calls coming into the family home.
The federal wiretap statute, which makes interception of communi-
cations legal where one party consents, has been interpreted to per-
mit parents acting to protect the welfare of a child, to consent vi-
cariously for their child to the recording of their child's conversa-
tions. The Washington act, with its all-party consent requirement,
contains no such parental exception and no Washington court has
ever implied such an exception. We decline to do so now.189
After additional discussion of the Washington Legislature's view
that individual privacy trumps "law enforcement's ability to gather evi-
dence without a warrant,"' 90 the court, without reference to the fact that
the interception at issue was made by a private citizen instead of a law
enforcement officer acting on behalf of the state, determined that Mrs.
Dixon's trial testimony was improperly admitted and a retrial without
that evidence was ordered. 191
In looking at the Christensen case in the context of the vicarious
consent doctrine-and thereby ignoring that Washington is a two-party
consent state'9 2 -it is entirely possible that a court in a one-party consent
jurisdiction would still find the doctrine inapplicable under the facts of
the case. A court would likely so find because Mrs. Dixon's primary mo-
tive in recording the conversations between her daughter and Christensen
185. Id.
186. Id. at 191, 102 P.3d at 791.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 193-94, 102 P.3d at 792.
189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 199, 102 P.3d at 795.
191. Id. at 201, 102 P.3d at 796.
192. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2005).
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appears to be the assistance of law enforcement, and not necessarily the
assistance and protection of a child in need. 93 Nonetheless, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court made its decision without putting any credence in or
being willing to accept the doctrine of vicarious consent' 94 and, therefore,
attempting to fit the facts of the case with the doctrine was unnecessary.
Another case which one can read as a rejection of the vicarious
consent doctrine is the North Carolina case of State v. Shaw. 195 Decided
in 1991 -two years before the Thompson court first invoked the doctrine
and well before the Michigan or Washington state court decisions in Wil-
liams and Christensen-Shaw addresses a situation in which a mother
surreptitiously recorded a child's telephone conversation regarding drug
use and then turned that recording over to law enforcement. 96 Prior to
addressing the admissibility of the recordings at trial, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals recited the facts of the case. 197 After noting that Eddie
Lee Shaw had "pled guilty to the charge of felonious possession of a
controlled substance"' 98 after a motion to suppress the drugs was denied,
the court relayed the facts as follows:
The search warrant in this case was issued to Detective John Moore.
Detective Moore's application for the warrant and his accompany-
ing affidavit relied on the contents of a tape-recorded telephone
conversation between defendant and another young man to establish
probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of a con-
trolled substance. The other man's mother had obtained the tape re-
cording on her own initiative, apparently by attaching a microcas-
sette tape recorder to a telephone extension line in her house. She
called the police after listening to the recorded conversation, part of
which involved the speakers' plans to get together about "shrooms,"
the street name for mushrooms (psilocybin). The mother played the
tape for Detective Moore and identified the speakers as her son and
defendant. Evidence at the suppression hearing suggested that the
woman's son and defendant did not know about, and had not con-
sented to, the taping of their phone conversation. 199
193. See Christensen, 153 Wash. 2d at 190, 102 P.3d at 790.
194. Id. at 193-94, 102 P.3d at 792.
195.404 S.E.2d 887 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
196. Id. at 888.
197. Id. at 887-88.
198. Id. at 887.
199. Id. at 888.
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As stated above, when the Shaw court issued its 1991 decision, the
doctrine of vicarious consent had yet to be invented or invoked.200 As
such, the court never expressly or directly addressed the issue. Its hold-
ing, however, supports the idea that had the doctrine been presented, the
court would have rejected it.20
In Shaw, the state unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the court
that the recordings were lawfully obtained under the telephone extension
exception found in Title 111.202 In rejecting the state's position, the court
repeatedly emphasized "that Title III is to be interpreted from its plain
language 20 3 and that "there is no express exception for electronic sur-
veillance between family members. 20 4 The court concluded with the
following:
Because [prior case law] directs us to interpret Title III by its ex-
press language, rather than by examination of legislative history or
interpretation of congressional intent, the case law authority [re-
garding the telephone extension exception] presented by the State is
inapplicable in North Carolina to the facts in this case. The United
States Supreme Court has similarly observed that "[t]he purpose of
the [wiretapping] legislation . .. was effectively to prohibit ... all
interceptions of oral and wire communications, except those spe-
cifically provided for in the Act."
We conclude, therefore, that the activity by the mother is prohibited
by Title III, which states that any exceptions to its prohibitions are"specifically provided in this chapter."
Because of the Shaw court's emphasis on the statute's express lan-
guage and its refusal to accept authority which allows for parent-child
wiretapping, 6 one can make a strong argument that the Shaw court
would have rejected any proffering of the vicarious consent doctrine.
Finally, in West Virginia Department of Health and Human Re-
sources ex rel. Wright v. David L.,207 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, in a very fact-specific ruling, declined to apply the vicari-
200. Again, the Thompson decision, which was the first decision to propose and accept the
vicarious consent doctrine, was not issued until 1993. See supra Part l1.B.2.a.
201. See Shaw, 404 S.E.2d at 888.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 889.
205. Id. (citations omitted).
206. Id.
207. 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994).
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ous consent doctrine in a specific set of circumstances.2 °8 In David L., a
custody dispute, the issue of vicarious consent arose when David L., fa-
ther of three children, used his mother, the children's paternal grand-
mother and babysitter, to place a voice-activated tape recorder in the
children's bedroom so that he could record their conversations with their
mother, Jill L. 20 9 The children were living with their mother at the
time.21 ° In addressing the vicarious consent doctrine, which David L. ar-
gued protected his conduct, the court wrote the following:
We do not disagree with the reasoning in Thompson; however, we
determine the facts of the present case are different from the facts of
Thompson .... [I]n the present case ... Jill L., not David L., was
awarded temporary custody of the children during the divorce pro-
ceedings. [Additionally] the recordings occurred in Jill L.'s house,
not David L.'s house, and he had absolutely no dominion or control
over Jill L.'s house where he procured his mother's assistance to
hide the tape recorder. Thus, under the specific facts of the case be-
fore us, we hold a parent has no right on behalf of his or her chil-
dren to give consent under [the state or federal wiretap laws] to
have the children's conversations with the other parent recorded
211while the children are living in the other parent's house.
In so holding, the court did not reject the vicarious consent doctrine
itself, but simply rejected its application in the case at bar because of its
particular facts and circumstances and the way that the recordings were
intercepted.212
These courts have not been the only governmental entities to ad-
dress, and either accept or reject, the vicarious consent doctrine. In addi-
tion to Thompson, Pollock, and the other courts that have accepted the
doctrine, one state has codified it in response to the outcome of the
aforementioned Bishop case.
3. Statutory Adoption of the Doctrine
The Georgia Legislature responded to the Court of Appeals' rejec-
tion of the vicarious consent doctrine in Bishop by amending that state's
consent exception to expressly include the doctrine of vicarious con-
208. Id. at 652.
209. Id. at 648.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 654.
212. Id.
20051
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 28:955
213sent. As currently codified, Georgia's statute provides that the parent
or guardian of a minor child is not prohibited from surreptitiously inter-
cepting the child's telephone conversations when the interception is done
"for the purpose of ensuring the welfare of such minor child."'2 14 Fur-
213. Commentator Alison S. Aaronson tells the story of the adoption of the vicarious consent
doctrine by the Georgia Legislature:
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and concluded that
Bishop's motion to suppress the tape recordings should have been granted ... [In so de-
ciding] the court reasoned that [Georgia law, as it then existed] precluded the application
of the vicarious consent exception. In addition, the court declared that "it is solely the
task of the legislature to amend [Georgia's wiretapping statute] to allow the admission
into evidence of tape recordings such as those at issue here, i.e., tapes made by parents
with a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for concern regarding the safety of their
children as victims of criminal conduct of another."
Several members of the Georgia House of Representatives took these words to
heart, and introduced a bill that was signed into law in April, 2000, allowing a parent to
monitor and intercept a minor child's phone conversations. Jim Stokes, a member of the
Georgia House Judiciary Committee, sponsored the bill based on a letter he received
from David Scott, the victim's father, asking him to address the lack of statutory support
for parents to legally wiretap their children's telephone conversations. [In drafting the
law,] [t]he Committee sought a limited means of permitting parents to monitor their chil-
dren's activities for the purpose of protecting them, particularly in sexual molestation
cases.
Mr. Stokes acknowledged that the trial court's decision not to admit the tape re-
cordings between Bishop and the victim into evidence under the previous law was the
correct legal decision. However, to assist parents in similar situations, the law needed to
be changed. Mr. Stokes agreed that parents have the authority to control their children,
especially in situations where they suspect their children are in trouble ....
Judith Manning, also a member of the Georgia House of Representatives . . .met
with the [Bishop] victim and her family, and she became involved in the [criminal case
against Bishop] "because it was clear to her that Bishop was 'overwhelmingly guilty' and
the girl's parents were helpless, going into trial with hearsay evidence." Although Ms.
Manning acknowledged that the United States Constitution prevents unreasonable inva-
sions of privacy, [she believed that the Bishop case] was a situation where there were ob-
vious signals that the child was suffering: the victim's grades dropped; her demeanor
changed dramatically; and she neglected her personal appearance. [Manning expressed a
belief that the] new law gives parents the power to monitor their children when they be-
gin manifesting different behavioral patterns. Ms. Manning stressed that the Bishop case
was a serious matter; it was not merely a case of a parent snooping through a child's
room or reading a diary to learn about the child's healthy personal life. Thus, [she stated,]
parents should be legally protected to intercept a child's phone calls where the child's
welfare is at stake, and parents should not abuse the law to determine the truth in situa-
tions other than where they suspect their child is in physical or emotional danger ....
As a result of Georgia's new law, on October 13, 2000, Superior Court Judge
George H. Kreeger convicted Bishop of child molestation, two counts of aggravated child
molestation, and aggravated sexual battery. Sentencing took place on November 29,
2000, and Bishop was sentenced to ten years for each count, a sum total of thirty years.
Alison S. Aaronson, Note, Changing with the Times: Why Rampant School Violence Warrants Le-
galization of Parental Wiretapping to Monitor Children's Activities, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 785, 827-830
(2001) (citations omitted).
214. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66(d) (2005).
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thermore, when the parent or guardian has a reasonable or good faith be-
lief that the recording is evidence of criminal conduct, the parent or
guardian can, under Georgia's statutory scheme, lawfully turn that re-
cording over to either law enforcement or the prosecuting attorney, and it
can further be used as evidence during a judicial proceeding.1 5 To date
no other jurisdictions have successfully codified the doctrine of vicarious
216consent as a specific part of a state wiretap statute.
The aforementioned courts that have rejected the vicarious consent
doctrine are not its only detractors. In addition to courts, many commen-
tators have also criticized the doctrine.217
C. Critics and Their Attacks on the Doctrine
Not everyone who has addressed the doctrine of vicarious consent
has given it a favorable response. In addition to its rejection by some
218courts, many commentators have leveled a myriad of criticisms against
the doctrine. Common criticisms include a belief that the doctrine (1) is
subject to misuse and abuse by scheming parents; (2) allows for an inva-
sion of the child's privacy; (3) fails to recognize the child's right to make
his or her own choices; and (4) will result in interfamily discord and re-
sentment when a child finds out that his or her parents have been secretly
recording private telephone conversations. Another common criticism is
that the language of Title III does not specifically recognize or articulate
215. The full text of Georgia's vicarious consent statute:
The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prohibit a parent or guardian of a
child under 18 years of age, with or without the consent of such minor child, from moni-
toring or intercepting telephonic conversations of such minor child with another person
by use of an extension phone located within the family home, or electronic or other
communications of such minor child from within the family home, for the purpose of en-
suring the welfare of such minor child. If the parent or guardian has a reasonable or good
faith belief that such conversation or communication is evidence of criminal conduct in-
volving such child as a victim or an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to involve such
child in criminal activity affecting the welfare or best interest of such child, the parent or
guardian may disclose the content of such telephonic conversation or electronic commu-
nication to the district attorney or a law enforcement officer. A recording or other record
of any such conversation or communication made by a parent or guardian in accordance
with this subsection that contains evidence of criminal conduct involving such child as a
victim or an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to involve such child in criminal activity
shall be admissible in a judicial proceeding except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b) of this Code section.
Id.
216. An attempt to codify the doctrine was made in Virginia in 2000. That attempt, however,
failed. See Aaronson, supra note 213, at 788 n.14.
217. See infra Part II.C.
218. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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that a parent has the right to consent on behalf of a child-the reason
why the court in Williams rejected the doctrine.21 9
1. The doctrine is subject to misuse
and abuse by conniving parents.
Perhaps the foremost criticism of the vicarious consent doctrine is
the belief that some parents who seek to invoke the doctrine may not ac-
tually have the child's best interest in mind when recording his or her
telephone conversations, but may harbor ulterior motives instead. As one
author wrote, "there is great potential for abuse of this exception." 220
This is of particular concern in those cases that involve contentious cus-
tody disputes and deteriorating families, as do "the majority of the re-
ported parental wiretapping cases. 221 One author, commenting on the
doctrine's potential misuse, wrote:
[W]hat divorcing parents believe is best for their children can be in-
herently self-motivated during child custody battles. In other words,
"[t]here are ... a number of possible conflicts between the motives
or interests of parents and the best interests of their children." One
study lists several possible motives for seeking child custody: nar-
cissism, vengeance against one's former spouse, child support
money, mitigation of amount of child supports, desire to demon-
strate that the parent cares, and furtherance of career goals.
It is thus questionable whether parents objectively can decide what
is best for their children at a time when [they are or may become]
"[j]ealous, angry, or distraught." 222
This concern was echoed by the Williams court, which wrote that''we are also cognizant that granting a parent the ability to consent on
behalf of a child in this context is likely to have widespread implications
and may encompass surreptitious actions by parents with less than laud-
able motives.22 3
219. Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
220. Ann B. Frick & Marjorie J. Long, Interspousal Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: An
Update - Part 11, 24 COLO. LAW 2569, 2570 (1995).
221. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1017.
222. Debra Bogosavljevic, Note, Can Parents Vicariously Consent to Recording a Telephone
Conversation on Behalf of a Minor Child?: An Examination of the Vicarious Consent Exception
Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
321, 342 (2000) (citations omitted). See also Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1020 ("Additionally, [the
doctrine of vicarious consent] could lead to circumstances where a parent could conceivably use
wiretapping for their own devious means, subjecting their former spouse and child to emotional
blackmail.").
223. Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 781.
[Vol. 28:955
Wiretaps & Vicarious Consent
Adding to this concern is the fact that in some cases, conclusively
proving or disproving that a parent truly acted in what he or she believed
was the child's best interest-and without any ulterior motive-can be
almost impossible. As one concerned author insightfully wrote, "when
parents assert that they acted in the best interests of their children when
recording a conversation, courts have no way to accurately check the
assertion., 224 Along these lines, it is also possible that a parent might, in
an attempt to avoid liability under Title III, "claim that the action was
undertaken to protect the best interests of the child, 225 when that is not
actually the case. In other words, a well-researched lawyer may be able
to present evidence to the effect and argue that a parent was acting in a
child's best interest at the time he or she recorded the child's conversa-
tion, when in fact the parent's motives were very different.
The Pollock case provides a good example of how this criticism
might arise in the context of a real case. In Pollock, the ultimate issue of
contention between the parties was custody of fourteen-year-old Court-
ney.226 The girl's mother had recorded a handful of telephone conversa-
tions between her daughter and the girl's father.227 When the civil suit for
alleged Title III violations arose, the mother claimed that in recording the
conversations she was acting out of concern for her daughter's well-
being.228 Courtney and her father, however, claimed that the true motive
was a combination of retaliation and revenge on the part of the mother
for previous instances of recording by Courtney and her father, and a
desire to "overhear Courtney's confidential attorney client conversations
with her lawyer., 229 After addressing these disputed facts and the vicari-
ous consent doctrine, the Sixth Circuit ultimately refused to grant sum-
mary judgment in the matter.230 The court wrote:
Given the conflicting evidence offered by the parties, we find that
there is a dispute as to material facts, making this case inappropriate
224. Bogosavljevic, supra note 222, at 343. One commentator expressed concern regarding
what a court would do when it cannot easily decide whether the parent was truly acting in what was
believed to be the child's best interest, writing that "[i]n a situation where it is unclear if the parent
had the best interests of the child at heart, or had ulterior motives such as blackmail or harassment, it
is possible that a court would err on the side of caution, trusting that the parent was truly concerned
about their child." Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1021-22. See also Frick, supra note 220, at 2570
("The danger is that after-the-fact subjective contentions that the parent is acting in the best interests
of the child is an unworkable, unverifiable standard.").
225. Frick, supra note 220, at 2570.
226. Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1998).
227. Id. at 603.
228. Id. at 604.
229. Id. at 605.
230. Id. at 613.
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for summary judgment. Thus, as in Thompson, while the doctrine of
vicarious consent is properly adopted, there are questions of mate-
rial fact as to Sandra's motivation in taping the conversations, and
this issue should be submitted to a jury.2 31
It is certainly possible, and probably even likely, that in this and
other similar cases a jury would find it difficult to decide whether "the
action was undertaken to protect the best interests of the child 23 2 or
whether such a claim is simply an attempt to avoid liability under Title
III. Hence the criticism of the vicarious consent doctrine.
2. The doctrine undermines a child's right to privacy.
A second concern that some have expressed in relation to the doc-
trine of vicarious consent is that "the privacy interest[s] of both parent
and child [are] seriously eroded by the [recognition] of a vicarious con-
sent exception. 2 33 On this point, one commentator discussing the Pol-
lock decision wrote:
A related problem with the vicarious consent doctrine is that it fails
to address a minor's right to privacy. It is generally recognized
among psychologists that a lack of privacy is detrimental to the de-
velopment of the child. Scholars have spoken of the importance that
increased privacy has on a child's development, noting a connection
between deviant behavior and an invasion of privacy.2
34
An application of the vicarious consent doctrine does result in some
invasion of a child's privacy because parents who surreptitiously inter-
cept telephone conversations will become privy to anything discussed in
those conversations, including information about the child that is both
positive and negative, personal and not personal. Because parents cannot
predict which topics their child might discuss in advance of making or
listening to a recording, they may learn more about the child than just
what problems the child is experiencing or what dangerous situations the
child might be in, thus going beyond the scope or intent of the vicarious
consent doctrine.
231. Id. at 612.
232. Frick, supra note 220, at 2570.
233. Id.
234. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1019 (citations omitted).
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3. The doctrine fails to recognize a child's right and
ability to make his or her own choices.
Another criticism leveled at the doctrine of vicarious consent is that
it does not recognize, but instead ignores, the fact that as children grow
older, their ability to consent to certain things or to make important deci-
sions regarding their own lives increases. One commentator, addressing
this issue in general and the Pollock decision in particular, wrote the fol-
lowing:
The first problem with the Sixth Circuit's decision revolves around
[the child's] age and the consent issues it raises. In the other courts
that adopted the doctrine, the child was much younger, usually un-
der the age of ten years old. At the age of fourteen, assuming that
she is mentally and emotionally mature, a child should have a
greater capacity to consent on issues that affect her than someone
who is a pre-teenager. Furthermore, studies conducted in the 1970s
have shown that by the age of fourteen or fifteen, most children will
demonstrate full adult competence and are therefore capable of pro-
viding informed consent. This raises the question, then, of whether
it serves the interests of justice to allow a parent to fictitiously claim
that she vicariously consented for her child, when her child is of
both the age and maturity to consent for herself.23 5
Therefore, the author concludes, "one of the weaknesses in Pollock
is that it fails to adequately address the issue of a child's evolving capac-
ity to consent, free from parental guidance, for herself.' 2 36
As the author seems to indicate, this is a criticism that becomes
more valid as the age of the child increases,23 v and is a criticism with
which the Thompson court, based on its direct focus on the age of the
children, would likely agree.
4. The doctrine may result in interfamily discord or resentment.
In addressing the vicarious consent doctrine, some commentators
have further suggested that allowing one parent to make and use a sur-
reptitiously recorded telephone conversation between the other parent
and a child, or a child and a third party, will lead to significant family
discord, and may also cause a child to resent one or both parents for their
235. Id. at 1018 (citations omitted). On this point, the author also references the fact that "court
decisions have recognized that older children may have a right to consent for themselves in circum-
stances such as abortion (allowing for judicial bypass) and certain medical procedures." Id.
236. Id. at 1019.
237. Id.
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interception and use of the communication. On this topic, one commenta-
tor wrote as follows:
The invasion of a child's privacy interest can have an extremely
negative impact on the child's relationship with the parent who
conducted the interception. The impact may not occur immediately,
due to the child's age at the time of the electronic interception, but
may occur years later when the child is old enough to understand
the breach of his or her privacy interest.238
In this vein, some have expressed that the doctrine may cause dis-
trust within the family unit. As one author wrote, "[c]ontrary to protect-
ing the child's best interest, there is a possibility that the vicarious con-
sent doctrine could actually lead to the further deterioration of the family
unit by creating an atmosphere of distrust '239 between family members.
Such a situation was clearly evident in the Pollock case, where fourteen-
year-old Courtney appears to have resented her mother for intercepting
Courtney's conversations with her father.240
5. There is no express exemption in the statute.
A final argument that some critics of the vicarious consent doctrine
have made is that, because there is no express domestic exemption in
241Title III, courts cannot create such an exemption. In other words, these
critics argue that Congress would have included an express exception for
domestic wiretapping if it had wanted to do So. 24 2 A handful of courts,
addressing the issue of interspousal wiretapping (as opposed to parent-
child wiretapping) have made just such an argument.2 43 While this criti-
cism is generally focused on cases involving a spouse who intercepts the
other spouse's communications, it is applicable to the vicarious consent
doctrine because the vicarious consent cases involve a form of domestic
wiretapping. Similarly, critics argue that if Congress had wanted a vi-
carious consent exception, it would have created one.244 Such was the
position of the Williams court:
238. Frick, supra note 220, at 2569.
239. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1020.
240. See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1998).
241. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) ("There is no express
exception [in Title Ill] for instances of willful, unconsented to electronic surveillance between
spouses.").
244. See, e.g., Williams, 581 N.W.2d at 780.
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[The language of Title Ill] gives us no indication that Congress in-
tended to create an exception for a custodial parent of a minor child
to consent on the child's behalf and tape record telephone conversa-
tions between the child and a third party. Were it the intent of Con-
gress to create a safe harbor from liability for custodial parents re-
cording the conversations of their children, it, too, could have easily
done so.245
Those who have made this argument have relied on sources such as
the legislative history of Title III itself, which states that "[a] broad pro-
hibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly
in domestic relations and industrial espionage." 246 Interpreting this
statement and the language of the statute literally, these courts and com-
mentators have concluded that "there is no express exception for elec-
tronic surveillance between family members. 24 7 These courts and com-
mentators have further argued that "there is no room in Title III for im-
plied exceptions" such as the vicarious consent exception, as "the only
exceptions to the prohibition against unauthorized interception of tele-
phone conversations are those specifically listed in the statute. 24 8
Despite the existence of these concerns, a growing number of
courts have adopted the vicarious consent doctrine since its advent in the
1993 Thompson decision.249 As the doctrine continues to gain acceptance
in both state and federal courts, judges in all jurisdictions should hold
that the doctrine is valid in the criminal context as well as the family law
context. Courts addressing the issue should further hold that prosecutors
can use recordings of conversations secretly intercepted by parents in
accordance with the principles of the doctrine in the prosecutions of ei-
ther the minor child whose parents made the recording or a parent or
other third party with whom the child has had an intercepted conversa-
tion.
III. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS CONSENT
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
When applied in situations involving criminal activity, the doctrine
of vicarious consent can be an important tool for both concerned and lov-
ing parents and prosecutors. Courts facing situations in which a parent
245. Id.
246. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2274.
247. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 404 S.E.2d 887, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
248. See, e.g., State v. Capell, 966 P.2d 232, 241 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (Armstrong, J. dissent-
ing).
249. See supra Part II.B.2.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
has surreptitiously recorded a child's telephone conversations should
recognize and accept a parent's right and authority to record their chil-
dren's telephone conversations when a parent reasonably believes that
their child is either a victim of a crime or is about to engage in criminal
activity. Furthermore, criminal courts faced with the issue should hold
that prosecutors can use those recordings as admissible evidence in
prosecuting one or both of the parties to the conversation-including the
child for whom the parent gave vicarious consent-in the event that a
criminal case goes to trial.
The courts should so hold for three reasons. First, all courts should
accept the vicarious consent doctrine because it is a legally viable doc-
trine in the sense that it is consistent with the language and legislative
history of Title II1. Furthermore, these same courts should accept the
doctrine because it provides a legitimate benefit to society. Second,
criminal courts should accept the vicarious consent doctrine because the
doctrine's underlying principle-that of the protection of children-is
clearly consistent with an application of the doctrine in the criminal con-
text. Third, criminal courts should accept an application of the doctrine
in the criminal context because a number of the criticisms leveled against
the doctrine in the civil context are not as significant when it is applied in
the criminal context, meaning a use in the criminal context is potentially
more palatable to critics than a use in the civil realm.
A. Defending the Doctrine: Why the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent is
Both a Legally Viable and Socially Beneficial Doctrine
A handful of courts and commentators have criticized the vicarious
consent doctrine for the reasons stated above. 250 These criticisms not-
withstanding, the doctrine of vicarious consent is a legally viable and
socially beneficial doctrine, particularly when applied in the context of
providing evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. As such, criminal
courts should recognize the doctrine and hold that it is an acceptable use
of parental authority. After so holding, these courts should further recog-
nize the right of prosecutors to use recordings made in accordance with
the principles of the vicarious consent doctrine during the trial of a party
to the intercepted communication.
1. The doctrine of vicarious consent is a legally viable doctrine.
The vicarious consent doctrine is a legally viable doctrine in the
sense that its application is consistent with both statutory and case law in
250. See supra Part II.C.
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the area of eavesdropping and child privacy rights, as well as with the
legislative history of Title III. Specifically, the doctrine is consistent with
Title III and its legislative history in that the legislative history contains
evidence of congressional intent to both exempt parental eavesdropping
from the law and to allow courts to interpret the consent exception in a
very broad manner that would allow for an application of the doctrine.
Additionally, the doctrine is consistent with the principle that children
have a diminished privacy interest in life's affairs such that the child's
right to privacy is not excessively or unlawfully violated when a protec-
tive and concerned parent surreptitiously intercepts one or more of a
child's telephone conversations.
a. There is evidence of congressional intent to exempt
parental eavesdropping from the law.
The doctrine of vicarious consent is legally viable because evidence
indicates a congressional intent to exempt parental eavesdropping from
Title III. On this subject, a handful of courts that have addressed the is-
sue of vicarious consent have found that the legislative history to Title III
provides evidence of such intent. In Schieb v. Grant,251 for example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[w]e cannot attribute to Con-
gress the intent to subject parents to criminal and civil penalties for
recording their minor child's phone conversations out of concern for the
child's well-being. 2 52 A few years later in Campbell v. Price, the Fed-
eral District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed, holding
that "[t]he Court is of the opinion that Congress did not intend to tread
into the waters of domestic relations in situations ... where a custodial
parent is clearly acting in the good faith belief that his action furthers the
best interests of his minor child., 253 In so holding, each of these courts
referenced congressional testimony by one Professor Herman Schwartz,
who testified before Congress that "[n]ow, we can see in certain circum-
stances where [the extension phone exception] makes some sense. I take
it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage
daughter or some such related problem., 254 In referencing this statement,
these courts have "found this statement ... reflective of 'the general un-
derstanding of those involved in the legislative process regarding the
251.22 F.3d 149 (7th Cir. 1994).
252. Id. at 154.
253. Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
254. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (1977) (citing Hearings on the Anti-Crime
Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong. 901 (1967) (statement
of Professor Herman Schwartz)).
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scope of the statute in situations involving parental eavesdropping on a
minor child., 255
With respect to congressional intent and legislative history, it is im-
portant to distinguish between parent-child wiretapping and interspousal
wiretapping, as they are "qualitatively different" 256 from one another. As
referenced above, a number of courts have found that Title III prohibits
interspousal wiretapping, or one spouse intercepting another spouse's
telephone or other covered communications.257 In doing so, these courts
have referenced the legislative history of Title III and statements con-
tained therein that refute the existence of an interspousal exception to the
prohibitions of Title 111.258 That legislative history, however, seems to
focus primarily on interspousal wiretapping, not parent-child wiretap-
ping, and apart from Professor Schwartz's statement that "nobody wants
to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or
some such related problem,"2 59 the legislative history contains a distinct
"lack of testimony concerning parental wiretapping. 26 ° In short, there is
nothing inconsistent about prohibiting interspousal wiretapping yet al-
lowing parent-child wiretapping.
This position-that the prohibitions of Title III prohibit interspousal
but not parent-child wiretapping-is one that has been accepted by at
least two federal circuits. Specifically, in Heggy v. Heggy26 1 and United
262States v. Jones, the Tenth and Sixth Circuits held that Title III covers
263 Teesmand therefore prohibits interspousal wiretapping. These same circuits,
however, in the aforementioned Thompson and Pollock decisions, have
also held-without overruling Heggy and Jones-that the doctrine of
vicarious consent is a viable legal doctrine. 64 Other courts have recog-
255. Campbell, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (quoting Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 n.5
(10th Cir. 1995)); see also State v. Capell, 966 P.2d 232, 234 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) ("To the extent
that there could be any doubt about what Congress would have intended in light of the facts in the
case, the legislative history underlying the act expressly states that Congress did not want "to make it
a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some such related problem.").
256. Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1991).
257. See supra Part I.A.3.
258. See id.
259. Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679.
260. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 794.
261. 944 F.2d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
262. 542 F.2d 661, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1976).
263. See Heggy, 944 F.2d at 1539 ("[T]he district court below held that Title III ... does apply
to interspousal wiretaps. We agree with the district court, and join the majority of federal circuit
courts in holding that Title III does provide a remedy for such wiretapping."); Jones, 542 F.2d at 673
("[Tihe plain language of the section and the Act's legislative history compels interpretation of the
statute to include interspousal wiretaps.").
264. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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nized a distinction between interspousal and parent-child wiretapping as
well. In State v. Capell,265 for example, the Oregon Court of Appeals
wrote the following:
Finally, the recording of conversations by a parent in the interest of
a son's well-being simply is not the kind of concern that Congress
had when it focused on interception of communications by private
individuals. Rather, its concern was with wiretapping for purposes
of commercial espionage and marital litigation.26
In so holding, the court makes a very clear distinction between par-
ent-child wiretapping and interspousal wiretapping done for the purpose
of marital litigation, holding that Congress intended to prohibit one while
allowing the other. 267 Based on these holdings, a strong argument can be
made that the statements in the legislative history refuting the existence
of an interspousal wiretapping exception are not inconsistent with Pro-
fessor Schwartz's view of the law, referenced above,268 and therefore that
the vicarious consent doctrine is consistent with the underlying intent of
Title III. In short, "[a]pplying the theory of vicarious consent in the par-
ent-child context produces the most consistent result while respecting
Congressional intent., 269
b. The consent exception to Title III is to be interpreted broadly.
Courts interpreting Title III have held that the existing one-party
consent exception, which again allows an interception of a covered
communication when one party to the communication consents to the
interception, should be interpreted broadly. The Thompson court, for ex-
ample, specifically held that "[i]t is clear from case law that Congress
intended the consent exception to be interpreted broadly., 270 Similarly, in
United States v. Amen, 271 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the consent needed to invoke the one-party consent exception
can be either express or implied.272 Specifically, the court held that "[t]he
legislative history shows that Congress intended the consent requirement
to be construed broadly" and that "[t]he Senate Report specifically says
in relation to section 2511(2)(c): 'Consent may be expressed or im-
265. 966 P.2d 232 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
266. Id. at 234.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
269. Rahavy, supra note 21, at 97.
270. Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Utah 1993).
271. 831 F.2d 373 (2nd Cir. 1987).
272. Id. at 378.
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plied.' ' 273 In so holding, these courts have recognized that Congress did
not enumerate all the ways that consent could be given under the one-
party consent exception. They further illustrates that it is permissible to
make reference to the legislative history when interpreting the one-party
consent exception as that is exactly what the Amen court did in referenc-
ing the aforementioned Senate Report.274 Such a view of the consent ex-
ception is consistent with the viability of the vicarious consent doctrine
because the doctrine is not specifically enumerated in the statute and
those courts that have accepted the doctrine have justified doing so by
referencing those portions of the legislative history that reference the
ability of a parent to intercept a child's telephone and other communica-
275tions. In short, when the consent exception is "construed broadly"
there is more than enough room for the vicarious consent doctrine.
c. The doctrine recognizes and is consistent with the long-accepted
parental right to decide what is best for a child.
It is a long-standing principle of law that parents have a right to de-
cide what is best for their children-a view supported by those situations
in which the law recognizes that a child needs parental consent in order
to engage in a particular activity. 276 In this vein, many have argued that
the courts should recognize that right by staying out of the majority of
parent-child matters and refraining from making decisions on behalf of
capable and responsible parents that go to the issue of how to raise a
child. As one author wrote, "[d]eference to parental decisions about their
children stands as the nearly universal exception from self-determination
under the Constitution., 277 In addressing the issue of a parent's right to
consent for a child, another author noted that "[s]upporters of parental
consent on behalf of the child argue that the rights associated with being
a parent are fundamental and basic rights; therefore, parents should be
afforded wide latitude in making decisions for children, as they are in the
best position to determine their child's needs., 278
273. Id.; see also Grigg-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We agree with the
Second Circuit that 'Congress intended the consent requirement to be construed broadly."').
274. Amen, 831 F.2d at 378.
275. See supra Part III.A. La.
276. For example, many jurisdictions require parental consent for children of certain ages to
marry, to obtain an abortion, or have certain medical procedures performed. See generally Karkosak,
supra note 54, at 1021.
277. Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L. REV. 965, 969 (1989).
278. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1017; see also Laura S. Killian, Concerned or Just Plain
Nosy? The Consequences of Parental Wiretapping Under the Federal Wiretap Act in Light of Pol-
lock v. Pollock, 104 DICK. L. REV. 561, 571 (2000) ("Parents, as the natural guardians of their chil-
dren, hold the legal right to act on their behalf to make decisions for their protection.").
1000 [Vol. 28:955
Wiretaps & Vicarious Consent
The doctrine of vicarious consent is consistent with this long-
accepted view of parental autonomy as it allows a parent to tape record a
child's telephone conversations without fear of civil or criminal liability,
and without the child's knowledge or approval, when the parent believes
that doing so will further the child's best interest. 279 Specifically, it al-
lows a parent to act on behalf of and make a decision for a child in con-
senting to an interception of a communication, and thereby shows some
deference to parents in making certain decisions for their children. As
one author wrote, "Congress entrusts parents with a right to decide on
their children's behalf in many situations, so consenting to wiretapping
of a telephone conversation seems a natural extension of those parental
rights." 280 This is not to say that children do not have the ability to make
choices on their own, and the doctrine does not seek to take away a
child's opportunity to make his or her own choices in many areas of life.
It simply recognizes the principle that "parental rights can be superior to
children's rights, especially in light of the parents' responsibilities for the
care and upbringing of their children. 28' In short, the vicarious consent
doctrine acknowledges that in certain situations parents have a right to
act on their children's behalf, even when such action goes against the
child's wishes.
d. A child has a diminished privacy interest in life's affairs that
is not violated by the doctrine of vicarious consent.
The doctrine of vicarious consent is legally viable because it allows
parents to act without significantly violating a child's limited right to
privacy. Though children have a right to privacy, that right is less signifi-
cant than the right to privacy enjoyed by adults. In other words, there are
areas in which children have a diminished right of privacy. The Eighth
Circuit, addressing this issue, has stated that "not all constitutional rights
have been made equally applicable to minors as to adults, and it is well
established that the activities of children may be more highly regulated
than those of adults. In particular, a state may determine that a child is
not possessed of full capacity for individual choice. ' 282 Addressing this
same issue of a child's right to privacy and the vicarious consent doc-
trine, one author wrote the following:
279. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
280. Labriola, supra note 53, at 456.
281. State v. Liebau, 67 P.3d 156, 160 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
282. M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 177 (8th Cir. 1977).
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While ... a fictitious consent may seem violative of privacy rights,
commentators believe that children, while entitled to privacy, do not
generally have the same expectations that adults do. Instead, it is of-
ten assumed that a parent will act in the best interests of the child,
even if this means that the child's right to privacy is violated.283
One of the benefits of the vicarious consent doctrine is that when it
is appropriately applied-in situations in which the parent truly is acting
in what he or she believes to be the child's best interest-the child's right
to privacy is generally only violated when the child truly is in a danger-
ous or difficult situation. When applied in these circumstances, the doc-
trine generally does not allow parents to intercept telephone calls to find
out about a child's romantic interests, plans for the weekend, or other
personal issues that do not present the child with a substantial potential
for harm. In other words, it does not allow a parent to engage in a whole-
sale recording of a child's telephone conversations. Instead the parent is
only permitted to intercept the child's communications, and therefore
encroach upon the child's privacy, and do so without civil or criminal
liability, when there can be a showing of parental concern for the child's
well-being. 284 On this topic one commentator wrote the following:
[B]y adopting the vicarious consent doctrine [in Pollock] the
Sixth Circuit has effectively limited the number of cases where a
parent can escape liability for recording his child's conversations.
Under the "extension phone" exemption, parents were released from
liability without any determination into their motives behind the re-
cording. Pollock instead examines these motives, calling for a case-
by-case determination that a parent had an objectively reasonable
concern, and was acting in the best interest of the child. If the parent
did not have such a concern, then he will be subjectively liable un-
der the Federal Wiretapping Statute. By using a "good faith, objec-
tively reasonable basis" for determining that a parent's consent was
necessary, the Sixth Circuit subjects a parent's actions to much
stricter scrutiny than was previously available.
285
Such a subjection of parental actions to a stricter scrutiny is appro-
priate because it protects the child's right to privacy in all situations ex-
cept those that present a danger to the child, thus protecting the child's
physical and emotional well-being, as well as the child's right to an ap-
propriate level of privacy. This is particularly true when the parent is re-
quired to prove to a judge or jury that he or she was truly motivated by
283. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1016.
284. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
285. Karkosak, supra note 54, at 1016.
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concern for the child. If a parent is unable to provide such proof, civil
and criminal liability can attach, thus giving parents an incentive to in-
voke the doctrine only when its terms are truly met. In short, by permit-
ting privacy to be compromised in only those situations in which it is
necessary to protect the child, the vicarious consent doctrine allows for a
more palatable and necessary invasion of privacy.
In summary, the vicarious consent doctrine is a legally viable doc-
trine because it it recognizes and is consistent with the language and leg-
islative history of Title III, those court decisions that have held that the
consent exception should be interpreted broadly, and the long-accepted
parental right to decide what is best for a child. For these reasons, courts
addressing the legality of the doctrine should not hesitate to adopt it in
appropriate situations.
2. The vicarious consent doctrine is a righteous or
socially beneficial doctrine.
The vicarious consent doctrine is a righteous doctrine in the sense
that recognition of the doctrine provides a significant benefit to society.
The doctrine is beneficial to society because, in addition to assisting par-
ents in fulfilling their obligation to promote their children's best inter-
ests, it helps to protect children against the undue influence of others.
Furthermore, when parents act in an effort to further the welfare of their
children, the doctrine protects them from the civil and criminal penalties
that attach to violations of Title III and its state law counterparts.
a. The doctrine protects and assists parents in fulfilling their parental
obligation to protect their children against the undue influence of others.
The vicarious consent doctrine is a socially beneficial doctrine be-
cause its underlying purpose is to protect children from the undue and
unseemly influence of others, whether it be a parent, a sibling, or a non-
family member who is seeking or would seek to negatively influence the
child. Courts have recognized that there are times "when a child is under
significant criminal influence by another and such criminal influence
poses a genuine risk which is not recognized by a child of tender
years, 286 and the doctrine aids concerned parents in protecting their
children from these types of situations.
In this regard, it is a generally accepted principle of law that parents
have a duty to protect their minor children. 287 This is because juveniles
286. Bishop v. Georgia, 526 S.E.2d 917, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
287. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 823.
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"often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid the choices that could be detrimental to them."288 This duty to pro-
tect includes, but is not limited to, the obligation to "assess the daily risks
the child confronts, and to make choices regarding the most appropriate
and reasonable manner to protect the child, 289 as well as a more general
"obligation to protect their children by assuring that they stay out of
trouble and are kept safe from harm., 290 In some jurisdictions this duty is
codified or set forth in case law. In Alabama, for example, the courts
have held that "parents have a common law duty to protect their minor
children., 29 1 The United States Supreme Court has also referenced a pa-
rental obligation to promote a child's best interests. 92 Perhaps the most
significant aspect of the doctrine of vicarious consent--one that supports
the view that the doctrine is a righteous and socially beneficial doc-
trine-is that it assists parents in fulfilling this obligation or duty to pro-
tect their children and provides them with yet another effective way to
learn and understand their children's needs and life situations. On this
issue one commentator wrote the following:
Life is vastly different now than it was even a decade ago. Children
are falling prey to dangerous temptations such as sex, drugs, alco-
hol, smoking, and gangs, and juvenile violence and crime have risen
over the years. "[M]any changes have taken place in society that
challenge the original presumption that parents are able to control
their children effectively." Allowing parents to wiretap their chil-
dren's phone conversations can help them gain access to informa-
tion that might provide their children with appropriate medical or
psychological treatment. Although some critics may argue that par-
ents can be involved in their children's lives by remaining involved
and focused in their children's daily activities, this criticism ignores
the fact that many children have difficulty communicating with their
parents. Resorting to surveillance tactics to keep children out of
danger is a measure that clearly falls within the boundaries of paren-
288. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
289. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 822.
290. Id. at 823.
291. Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 372 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
292. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected ... concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children ...
More important, [it] has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and cul-
ture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbring-
ing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now es-
tablished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) ("[Tihe custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.").
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tal duties, authority and care. In order for parents to exercise such
authority, it is necessary that they not be subject to the risk of suit at
the hands of their children.2 93
As the author states, recognizing a vicarious consent exception will
allow parents to monitor their children when doing so is in the children's
best interest without subjecting the parent to civil and criminal liability,
and will continue to do so as long as the parents' actions are based on a
reasonable belief that such monitoring is necessary.2 94
The facts of the cases that have adopted the principle of vicarious
consent demonstrate how the doctrine achieves its aim of assisting par-
ents in protecting their children. In Bishop, for example, the trial court
adopted the doctrine with a view toward allowing parents to protect their
children from sexual predators. 295 The same is true of the Massachusetts
Appeals Court in the Barboza case.296 In each of these cases, the surrepti-
tious recording of telephone conversations, done in accordance with the
principles of the vicarious consent doctrine, assisted the parents in pull-
ing their children out of dangerous situations in which they were being
both physically and emotionally victimized.297 Had the parents in those
cases been held criminally or civilly liable for recording their children's
conversations with two dangerous sexual predators, their ability to pro-
tect their children would have been seriously curtailed. In other words,
the principles underlying the vicarious consent doctrine assisted the par-
ents in fulfilling their parental obligation to protect their children and
promote their children's best interests without subjecting the parents to
the penalties associated with violations of Title III.
Even critics of the doctrine will admit that it assists parents in pro-
tecting their children. For example, one court that flatly rejected the vi-
carious consent doctrine admitted that the doctrine potentially provides
protection to children in need.29 8 Specifically, the Williams court wrote
that "[w]e, too, can admittedly perceive situations where depriving a par-
ent of the ability to vicariously consent for a child may deprive the child
293. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 821-22 (citation omitted). The author continues: "The con-
tinuing rise in school violence as evidenced by the ... Columbine High School shootings, undoubt-
edly justifies the need for parents to monitor their children's activities without the fear of liability."
Id. at 822.
294. See id.
295. Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917, 918-19, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
296. Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
297. In both cases the parents had legitimate suspicions of victimization and therefore had a
reasonable belief that they were acting in their child's best interest. See Bishop, 526 S.E.2d at 922;
Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 554.
298. See Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
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of the parent's ability to protect the child., 299 By assisting parents in pro-
tecting children against sexual predators and other unseemly people, the
doctrine provides a very significant benefit to society.
b. The doctrine of vicarious consent protects parents who
act in an effort to help their children.
The doctrine of vicarious consent is a socially beneficial and useful
doctrine because it protects parents who act in an effort to protect their
children. As stated above, the vicarious consent doctrine assists parents
in protecting their children against dangerous people who would seek to
take advantage of them.300 Additionally, the doctrine also protects the
parents as they attempt to act in a child's best interest. In the Barboza
case, for example, the Massachusetts courts chose to apply the vicarious
301consent doctrine. In doing so they not only assisted in protecting a
vulnerable child, but also indirectly held that since the interception was
not unlawful, the child's parents were not subject to any criminal or civil
liability for their actions. 302 If the courts had ruled the other way, refusing
to apply the doctrine and stating that the parents did not have a right to
intercept their child's phone conversations with Barboza, they may very
well have opened the door to a civil suit in which Barboza sought civil
penalties against Tom's parents.30 3 Additionally, a different ruling reject-
ing the vicarious consent doctrine and invoking the three types of penal-
ties available for violations of Title III might also have made the same
protective parents subject to criminal liability and might have disallowed
the use of key evidence in the criminal case.304 Had the court done so, the
true winner in the whole case would have been Barboza, the perpetrator
and sexual predator, and the losers would have been Tom's loving and
protective parents-a clearly unfair and unfavorable result.
By ruling as it did, however, the Massachusetts court essentially en-
sured that Barboza's victim's parents were protected from any civil or
criminal actions based on violations of Title III, and thereby agreed with
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which, as referenced above, held
that "[w]e cannot attribute to Congress the intent to subject parents to
299. Id.
300. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
301. See supra Part 1.B.2.b.
302. See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 555 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) ("We con-
clude that a recording by parents of their own minor son on the telephone in their own home, moti-
vated by concerns that he was being sexually exploited by an adult, does not violate Title III.").
303. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
304. As stated above, violations of Title Ill can result in civil, criminal, and evidentiary penal-
ties. See supra Part ll.A.2.b.
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criminal and civil penalties for recording their minor child's phone con-
versations out of concern for the child's well-being. '3 °5 In short, in rec-
ognizing the doctrine, the court provided the parents some much needed
protections as well as enhancing their ability to protect their young child
from a dangerous sexual predator.
The doctrine of vicarious consent is both a legally viable and a so-
cially valuable doctrine, and as such it should be accepted by all courts
that have the opportunity to address a situation in which the doctrine
might be of assistance to concerned and appropriately acting parents.
And while the doctrine is both viable and righteous in all contexts, it is
particularly so when the doctrine is applied in criminal cases.3 °6 For these
reasons, criminal courts in particular should rush to accept the doctrine.
B. The Underlying Principles of the Doctrine of Vicarious Consent
Support Its Application in Instances of Suspected Criminal Activity
As stated above, the doctrine of vicarious consent is based on a be-
lief that parents have a right to protect their children from harm or injury,
even if doing so requires them to make decisions on behalf of a child or
temporarily invade a child's privacy.30 7 Applying the doctrine to situa-
tions in which a parent suspects criminal activity or intent by one party to
a conversation or the other is in no way inconsistent with these princi-
ples. In fact, such an application of the doctrine of vicarious consent is
appropriate given that the concerns involved are very much consistent
with the underlying principles of the doctrine. In this vein, the applica-
tion of the doctrine of vicarious consent should be available both when a
parent suspects that his or her own child is a victim of criminal activity
and when a parent has reason to believe that his or her own child is plan-
ning or engaging in criminal activity. It should be available when the
child is a criminal actor or is planning to become a criminal actor be-
cause criminal activity on the part of the child can be as harmful to the
child as victimization by another person's criminal act.
1. The Doctrine of Vicarious Consent When the
Child Is a Victim of a Crime
At the core of the doctrine of vicarious consent is a desire to protect
an at-risk child and to further his or her best interests.30 8 As such, the
doctrine is an easy fit in those situations in which a parent suspects that a
305. Schieb v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994).
306. See infra Part I.IB.
307. See supra Part I1.A.2.a.
308. See id.
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child has been, is, or is about to become the victim of any type of crime,
whether at the hands of the other parent or a third party. This is because,
as stated above, recording a child's telephone conversations without a
fear of criminal or civil liability may very well aid the parent in confirm-
ing that a child is in danger and discovering the source of that danger.3 °9
As one author wrote, "[flew people can deny that a child has a right to be
protected from abuse, and that the best person to provide that protection
is usually a parent." 310 Certainly in the Barboza case, referenced above,
recording their son's conversations with Barboza assisted Tom's parents
in putting an end to his victimization and initiated the prosecution of a
dangerous man. The same is true in the Bishop case, referenced at the
beginning of this article, and is or could be true in countless other situa-
tions.
Whether a child is being sexually abused, provided alcohol or ille-
gal drugs, or may soon be the victim of some sort of violence, the vic-
timization of a child can have significant negative effects on the child.
These effects can be physical, mental, economic, or emotional in nature,
and can affect the child in both the long and short term.3 1 Any parent
who has his or her child's best interests in mind will desire to spare that
child any and all of these negative effects that accompany victimization
by a criminal actor, and since the vicarious consent doctrine may help
parents to ascertain that their child is in trouble, it is a perfect fit for these
types of situations.
2. The Doctrine of Vicarious Consent When the
Child Is the Criminal Actor
If a parent has a right to record a child's telephone conversations
when he or she believes that doing so will assist in protecting the child
from another person's criminal acts, then a parent should also be permit-
ted to record a child's telephone conversations when the parent believes
that the child is engaging in criminal activity and thereby potentially vic-
timizing someone else. While such recording does compromise the
child's privacy, parents should be permitted to do so under the doctrine
of vicarious consent for a number of reasons.
First, parents have a duty to protect their children from the dangers,
penalties, and stigmas associated with criminal activity, all of which will
309. See id.
310. Labriola, supra note 53, at 461.
311. See TED R. MILLER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES:
A NEW LOOK (1996).
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negatively affect the child.3 12 Parents also have a duty to protect society
from a child's potentially harmful criminal actions.3 13 When parents re-
cord a child's telephone conversations in an attempt to protect the child
and the community from the negative effects of criminal activity, they
are promoting the best interests of their child and therefore the require-
ments of the vicarious consent doctrine will generally be met.
Furthermore, many jurisdictions make parents financially responsi-
ble for the criminal and negligent acts of their children, meaning parents
have a financial interest in what their children do.314 Allowing parents to
intercept a child's communications in accordance with the standards set
forth in Thompson and Pollock will further assist parents in protecting
against the accumulation of financial liabilities. For these reasons, when
the standards of the doctrine of vicarious consent are met, parents who
surreptitiously intercept a child's telephone and other covered communi-
cations should not be found to be in violation of Title III, but should be
permitted to monitor and investigate their children's actions in this man-
ner. Furthermore, when prosecutors come into possession of such re-
cordings they should be permitted to use the recordings in the prosecu-
tion of the child.
a. Parents have a duty to protect their children from the dangers,
stigmas, and penalties associated with criminal activity.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[s]ociety has a
legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his
criminal activity. '  These "consequences" come in many forms, as en-
gaging in criminal behavior can be physically, mentally, and emotionally
dangerous for young people.31 6 The use of drugs, for example, can ruin a
child's life both physically and mentally.317 Additionally, buying and
312. See infra Part Ill.B.2.a.
313. See infra Part lll.B.2.b.
314. See infra Part lll.B.2.c.
315. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984).
316. In addressing this issue, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the conse-
quences of a juvenile's criminal activity include "potential physical injury which may be suffered
when a victim fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and from the downward spiral
of criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child." Id.
317. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("By saying this,
we do not condone the sale or use of illegal drugs in any amount. Some risk of death is always pre-
sent. As usage continues, the probability of adverse consequences rises. And these consequences are
not always death. Drug and alcohol abuse ruins untold lives of users and their loved ones. Relation-
ships and job performance suffer from an activity that has no social utility. These are but a few of the
reasons for drug laws, education concerning the danger of drug use, and other social measures aimed
at ameliorating this serious problem.").
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selling drugs can be a dangerous game.3'8 Drug debts are very often en-
forced with violence and intimidation,319 and a child or the family of a
child can be in serious danger if the child associates with drug dealers
who are willing to engage in violence or intimidation.320 Avoiding dan-
318. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1088 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "co-
caine trafficking is known to be an inherently dangerous criminal activity"); Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 591 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Pa. Super. 1991) (taking judicial notice of the fact that "drug deal-
ers are likely to be armed and dangerous").
319. As put by the United States Supreme Court, "it is well known, that drug smugglers do not
hesitate to use violence to protect their lucrative trade and avoid apprehension." Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669 (1989).
320. The facts of the Nebraska case of State v. Clark, 588 N.W.2d 184 (Neb. 1999), provide a
good example of the kinds of trouble that people, juveniles included, can find themselves in when
interactions with drug dealers goes bad-a type of trouble that a concerned parent who wants what is
in a child's best interest would prefer that his or her child avoid. In Clark, Patrick A. Clark was
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life plus ten years. The individual whom he
shot and killed, Leroy Fowler, was Clark's source for methamphetamine, an illegal drug to which he
was addicted. The court described the facts-and in particular the situation that Clark found himself
in when he accrued drug debts with Fowler-as follows:
Clark is a 42-year-old, divorced, unemployed carpenter addicted to methamphetamine.
Clark had met Fowler 7 months prior to the shooting, in August 1996, in connection with
a drug transaction. Clark began to buy methamphetamine regularly from Fowler, and his
debt to Fowler rapidly increased. According to Clark, in late 1996, Fowler insisted that
Clark work for him, apparently as security for the unpaid drug debt. In return for
Fowler's "fronting" drugs to Clark without immediate payment, Clark worked for Fowler
nearly every day without pay. Clark's debt to Fowler was not diminished by the services
he provided to Fowler. The uncontroverted evidence showed that Fowler imposed usuri-
ous "interest" and that Clark's debt continued to increase.
Clark's jobs for Fowler included . . . [driving] Fowler around Omaha two or three
times per week to collect money from drug sales. Clark testified that Fowler often gave
Clark Fowler's gun to carry as the two made these nighttime rounds to collect Fowler's
drug money. Fowler could not lawfully carry a gun, since he was a convicted felon. Clark
testified that Fowler used intimidation, threats, and violence to collect money due to him
for illegal drug sales.
Clark testified that he was dependent on the methamphetamine he got from Fowler,
but that he could not pay for it. Clark said he felt increasingly frightened by Fowler's in-
timidation of him, including threats to injure or kill Clark, his young children, and
Clark's parents . . . Clark stated that he felt he could not challenge Fowler because
Fowler supplied him with methamphetamine to feed his addiction and Clark believed that
Fowler would follow through on his threats to harm Clark or Clark's family because of
the unpaid drug debt.
In the week preceding the March 12, 1997, shooting, Clark testified that he had
worked for Fowler continuously for nearly 3 days without a break, including moving a
large cache of Fowler's weapons, ammunition, and drugs. The weapons included hand
grenades and automatic weapons. Clark testified that at approximately 7 p.m. on Friday,
March 7, after moving Fowler's cache to a storage unit, Clark told Fowler that he had to
get some sleep. According to Clark, Fowler grudgingly agreed to a few hours, telling
Clark, "You come down to my house at 10 o'clock or I'm going to chase you down."
Clark went to his parents' home, where he lived, to sleep. Contrary to Fowler's instruc-
tions, Clark did not return to Fowler's home.
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gerous situations that can arise when one commits these types of crimes
is definitely in the best interest of any child. A parent who is able to as-
certain that something like this is going on through recorded telephone
conversations made in accordance with the principles of the doctrine of
vicarious consent can then take the necessary steps to help the child-
steps that otherwise might not be taken.
In addition to the dangers of drug use and interacting with drug
dealers, other criminal behavior by minor children can put them in dan-
ger as well. For example, in some jurisdictions running away from home
is considered a criminal offense, 32 1 and it is well documented that there
are serious dangers that often accompany running away from home. 322
Danger can also attend property crimes, alcohol-related crimes, and vio-
lent crimes, as well as other crimes.3 23
Clark avoided Fowler's attempts to reach him until the following Wednesday,
March 12. Fowler arrived at the Clark home in a rage at approximately 8:40 a.m., soon
after Clark had awakened. Joseph Clark, Clark's brother, encountered Fowler as Fowler
arrived at the Clark home and Joseph Clark was leaving for work. Joseph Clark had never
before met Fowler. Fowler gave Joseph Clark "a dirty, dirty glare-like he could beat
somebody up."
Once inside the Clark home, Fowler demanded that Clark leave with him. He took
many of Clark's possessions, including clothes, tools, and three houseplants, which were
later found in the back of Fowler's car. Fowler did not expressly mention Clark's unpaid
drug debt, but Clark testified, "I knew that's what this was about" and "I knew he was
going to kill me and I knew he had the potential."
Clark testified that he believed that Fowler was carrying a gun underneath his
jacket. Fowler threatened to blow up the home of Clark's parents, who were in the upper
level of the house. Clark testified that he was very scared that Fowler, who looked "more
wicked this time than ever," would carry through with his threat. Clark believed that he
could not communicate with his parents to call police, so he agreed to leave with Fowler,
to get him out of the house.
Id. at 186-87. It was shortly after they left Clark's parents' house that Clark shot and killed Fowler,
for which he was convicted and sent to prison. What happened to Patrick Clark as a result of his drug
debts is not an uncommon occurrence in the world of narcotics distribution, and what happened to
Clark can and does happen to juveniles who are involved in drug transactions.
321. For example, in Ada County, Idaho, the county code reads as follows: "It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person under the age of eighteen (18) years . . .to attempt to run away or to run away
from his parents, guardian or other legal custodian, or to be or remain a person who has run away
from his parents, guardian or other legal custodian." ADA COUNTY, IDAHO, CODE § 5-5-1A (2005).
322. See, e.g., People v. R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 542 (Ill. 1989) ("When a minor detaches him-
self or herself from parental authority by running away from home, the minor jeopardizes his or her
welfare. The minor must find money, food and shelter, not to mention adult guidance, schooling, and
medical care, among other things. Even if the minor finds refuge with a relative or friend, the mi-
nor's welfare could still be in jeopardy because the minor may not be receiving proper care there.").
323. For example, the California courts, in a handful of unpublished opinions, have addressed
the dangers inherent in both parents exposing children to criminal activity and children involving
themselves in criminal activity. See, e.g., In re A.V., No. B 176601, 2005 WL 668494, at *3 n.3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) ("The [juvenile] court explained that the parents' shoplifting 'is my concern in the
case. What I should actually say is I think there is a history of the parents using the children to en-
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Parents have a duty to protect their children from these types of
dangers,324 and recording telephone conversations under the guidance of
the doctrine of vicarious consent assists parents in performing that duty:
[A]s long as the guardian has a good faith basis that is objectively
reasonable for believing that it is necessary to consent on behalf of
her minor children to the taping of the phone conversations, vicari-
ous consent will be permissible in order for the guardian to fulfill
her statutory mandate to act in the best interests of the child.325
If a parent has a good faith basis to believe that a child is engaging
in criminal activity that can bring harm to the child, and if the parent fur-
ther believes that recording the child's conversations will assist in pre-
venting or minimizing that harm, it is reasonable that the parent should
exercise that privilege without violating the federal wiretap statute or any
of its state counterparts. Such an exercise should be protected by the doc-
trine of vicarious consent in the criminal context just as it is in the family
law context.
There are also penalties associated with criminal activity, and it is
arguable that any concerned parent would hope his or her child could
avoid even the possibility of being subject to those penalties. Juvenile
detention, while important for purposes of community safety and ac-
countability, is not an ideal place for a child to reside. Addressing the
issue of detention in the state of New York, one family court judge wrote
the following:
gage in criminal activity and it is a danger to the children ... because you don't know what is going
to happen when you engage in criminal activity."'); Cynthia R. v. Superior Court, No. B175834,
2004 WL 2152399, at *3 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("She was directly using a baby as the cover. I
think it still indicates that she is willing to involve children in criminal behavior, which is inherently
dangerous to the children both in terms of their own morals .. but also because when people steal
sometimes people that are being stolen from pull guns and shoot you."); Cynthia M. v. Superior
Court, No. D035860, 2004 WL 1759264 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004):
Mother fails to acknowledge that, as with her drug problem, her criminal behavior detri-
mentally affects her children's well-being. Her criminal behavior exposes her children to
the potential dangers involved with a criminal lifestyle (for example, allowing them to sit
in a car driven by a person who is ingesting drugs), prevents her from being available to
parent her children during periods of incarceration, and provides a poor role model of ac-
ceptable behavior. The children are forced to suffer the consequences of mother's drug
addiction and criminal lifestyle.
Id. at *3.
324. M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 178 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The right to custody and control
over a minor child accrues to parents in reciprocation for their duty to support, educate and protect
that child.").
325. Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
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Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might try, is not the
most pleasant place in the world. If you put them in detention, you
are liable to be exposing these youngsters to all sorts of things. They
are liable to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to
sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them together
with a youngster that might be much worse than the y, possibly
might be, and it might have a bad effect in that respect.
Three United States Supreme Court justices agreed with these con-
cems in their dissent in Schall v. Martin,327 writing that "the impression-
ability of juveniles may make the experience of incarceration more inju-
rious to them than to adults; all too quickly juveniles subjected to preven-
tive detention come to see society at large as hostile and oppressive and
to regard themselves as irremediably 'delinquent.' 328
Furthermore, some crimes committed by juveniles are deemed to be
so serious that they can be charged in or waived into adult court where
the penalties are generally much more severe. In Idaho, for example, the
crimes of murder, attempted murder, robbery, rape, certain types of ar-
son, and delivery of a controlled substance within one thousand feet of a
school, among other crimes, are considered to be auto-waiver offenses,
meaning if a juvenile fourteen years of age or older commits one of those
crimes the case can be filed directly in adult court. 329 Additionally, other
crimes can be transferred or waived to adult court if the act was commit-
ted after the juvenile reached the age of fourteen and a juvenile judge
finds that the juvenile system cannot adequately deal with the juvenile
and the crime that has been committed, or a transfer to adult court is oth-
326. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 290 (1984) (citing J. STONE ET AL., CITIZENS'
COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK, INC., JUVENILE DETENTION PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK
CITY 3-4 (1970)) (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. 467 U.S. at 281-309.
328. Id. at 291.
329. See IDAHO CODE § 20-509(l) (Michie 2005). Idaho is not unique in allowing juveniles
who have committed certain crimes to be directly charged in adult court. In Mississippi, for example,
any "act attempted or committed by a child, which if committed by an adult would be punishable
under state or federal law by life imprisonment or death, will be in the original jurisdiction of the
[adult] court." MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(1)(a) (2005). Furthermore, in Mississippi any "act
attempted or committed by a child with the use of a deadly weapon, the carrying of which concealed
is prohibited by [law], or a shotgun or a rifle, which would be a felony if committed by an adult, will
be in the original jurisdiction of the [adult] court." § 43-21-151(1)(b). And finally, Mississippi's
juvenile courts, by statute, do "not have jurisdiction over offenses committed by a child ... on or
after his seventeenth birthday where such offenses would be a felony if committed by an adult." §
43-21-151(2).
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erwise appropriate. 330 That being the case, the juvenile bypasses the ju-
venile justice system and its lesser maximum penalties and becomes sub-
ject to adult penalties and incarceration in adult facilities. 331 Federal law
also provides that in certain enumerated circumstances a juvenile appro-
priately found to be under federal jurisdiction can be proceeded against
as an adult.332
330. Under Idaho law, a juvenile court must consider a number of factors when making a
determination of whether a waiver to adult court is appropriate. The factors to be considered are the
following:
(a) The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires
isolation of the juvenile beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; (b) Whether the al-
leged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being
given to offenses against persons; (d) The maturity of the juvenile as determined by con-
siderations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; (e) The
juvenile's record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile corrections system; (f)
The likelihood that the juvenile will develop competency and life skills to become a con-
tributing member of the community by use of the facilities and resources available to the
court.
IDAHO CODE § 20-508(8). The amount of weight to be given to each of these factors is discretionary
with the court. § 2 0-508(8)(g).
Mississippi law also provides for a discretionary waiver in certain cases:
If a child who has reached his thirteenth birthday is charged by petition to be a delinquent
child, the youth court, either on motion of the.., prosecutor or on the youth court's own
motion, after a hearing ... may, in its discretion, transfer jurisdiction of the alleged of-
fense . . . or a lesser included offense to the criminal court which would have trial juris-
diction of such offense if committed by an adult.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(1). After a hearing, "the youth court may transfer jurisdiction ... if
the youth court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there are no reasonable prospects of
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system." § 43-21-157(4). In making this determination, the
court is required to weigh certain factors similar to those considered by Idaho judges in making a
waiver determination. See § 43-21-157(5).
331. Bypassing the juvenile justice system can result in a significant increase in penalties. For
example, under Idaho law, the crime of robbery "is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not less than five (5) years, and the imprisonment may be extended to life." IDAHO CODE § 18-6503.
In other words, robbery carries a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment with the possibil-
ity of life in prison. Because robbery is an auto-waiver crime those penalties apply to any person
convicted of the crime, including juvenile offenders. Under Idaho's Juvenile Corrections Act, felo-
nies committed by juveniles are punishable by up to 180 days in detention, three years of probation
(or probation until age twenty-one if the crime is one of a sexual nature), and, if certain criteria are
met, commitment to the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC) not to exceed age twenty-
one. See § 20-520(d). Therefore, if robbery could be adjudicated in the Idaho juvenile justice system,
the maximum penalty for a juvenile sixteen years of age who committed a robbery would be com-
mitment to the IDJC for a period of five years. But because robbery is, per the statute, automatically
filed in the adult system, the same five-year period of confinement is the minimum penalty that can
be imposed on a sixteen-year-old juvenile who commits the crime of robbery, not the maximum. In
short, then, the range of penalties that can be imposed in juvenile court and adult court varies signifi-
cantly.
332. Federal law requires a factfinding with respect to several factors before a juvenile can be
transferred to district court:
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Criminal activity by a minor can also result in the imposition of
other penalties, such as the suspension of a drivers license, imposition of
fines and fees, community service, limitations on movement throughout
the community, temporary or long-term removal from the family home,
registration as a sex offender, full or partial waiver of a minor's Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and impo-
sition of restitution.33 3 If permitted to be applied in the criminal context,
the vicarious consent doctrine would protect a parent from criminal or
civil liability under Title III when that parent records a child's telephone
conversations under a reasonable belief that doing so will somehow al-
low the parent to prevent the minor from committing a crime that would
subject the child to these significant penalties. As the protection of the
child's best interests is the hallmark of the vicarious consent doctrine,334
A juvenile who is alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency and who is
not surrendered to State authorities shall be proceeded against under this chapter ... ex-
cept that, with respect to a juvenile fifteen years and older alleged to have committed an
act... which if committed by an adult would be a felony that is a crime of violence or an
offense described in ... the Controlled Substances Act. .. [or] the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act ... or section 922(x) of this title, or in section 924(b), (g), or (h)
of this title, criminal prosecution on the basis of the alleged act may be begun by motion
to transfer ... in the appropriate district court of the United States, if such court finds, af-
ter hearing, such transfer would be in the interest ofjustice ....
Evidence of the following factors shall be considered and findings with regard to
each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the in-
terest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged
offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's
present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment
efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed
to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000). The statute gives further guidance into how one of these factors should be
examined:
In considering the nature of the offense . .. the court shall consider the extent to which
the juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other
persons to take part in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled
substances or firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer
to adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.
Id.
333. In Idaho, for example, each of these potential penalties or sanctions is available to a juve-
nile judge. Specifically, Idaho Code, section 20-520 permits a juvenile judge, at sentencing, to im-
pose a period of probation; detention; community service; a revocation or restriction on driving
privileges; commitment to the state's juvenile corrections system; any examination or treatment
deemed necessary by the court, including substance abuse, medical, and psychiatric examinations
and treatment; restrictions on associations with parents and other individuals; restrictions on activi-
ties that the juvenile may wish to engage in; fines and fees associated with probation and the juvenile
court process; and "any other reasonable order which is in the best interest of the juvenile or is re-
quired for the protection of the public." IDAHO CODE § 20-520(1)(j) (Michie 2005).
334. See supra Part III.B.1.
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it is clearly applicable in such a scenario. In fact, not only is it applicable,
but its application can benefit both parent and child.
Finally, the stigma of a criminal conviction can significantly affect
a child's life. While juvenile records are not as readily accessible as adult
criminal records, they are not completely sealed in all states.335 As such,
when a potential employer or educational institution becomes aware of
an applicant's criminal past, that fact might affect the child's chances at
getting the job or getting into the school to which the child applies. Op-
portunities for military service may also be limited by a juvenile criminal
record. As avoiding these consequences is in the child's best interests,
criminal courts should hold that the doctrine of vicarious consent be
made available to parents seeking to protect their children from these
stigmas.
b. Parents have a duty to protect both their children and the community
at large from the negative effects that criminal activity
has on society and the victims of crimes.
Criminal activity affects more than the child who chooses to com-
mit the crime.336 Criminal activity also affects society in a number of dif-
ferent ways, and parents arguably have a duty to protect not only their
child, but society as well from the negative effects of criminal acts com-
mitted by the child.33 7 The effects of criminal activity on society include,
among other things, increased insurance rates and premiums from insur-
ance payouts following criminal activity, an increased need for law en-
forcement and other emergency services, physical and emotional injury
to crime victims, costs associated with various victim services agencies,
and large increases in state and local spending to prosecute and house
criminals. 338 The vicarious consent doctrine will not solve all of society's
ills; however, if it gives even a handful of parents the ability to protect
their children from victimization and protect society from criminal acts
committed by their children, it will have shown its worth as a legal prin-
ciple. One commentator, addressing the role that the vicarious consent
doctrine can play in these situations, wrote the following:
Many people blamed the parents of the students who committed the
[Columbine High School] shootings, and were incredulous that the
335. For example, under Idaho Court Administrative Rules, "if a juvenile is adjudicated guilty
of an act which would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult, the name, offense, and dispo-
sition of the court shall be open to the public." IDAHO CT. A. R. 32(d)(7)(E) (2005).
336. See generally MILLER ET AL., supra note 311.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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parents were unaware their children were planning such an elabo-
rate scheme in their own home. Parental wiretapping is a reasonable
solution in response to society's growing concern for the increasing
violence that seems to be prevalent among today's youth. The dra-
matic increase in schoolyard violence strongly indicates that parents
need to exercise authority and monitor their children's activities
without fear of liability. Parental wiretapping provides the perfect
tool to assist them.
339
Allowing parents the opportunity to monitor their children's activi-
ties and telephone conversations when they believe it is necessary to
promote the child's best interest will provide parents with the ability to
curtail criminal activity before it injures the child and society.
c. The possibility of parental liability for a child's criminal acts gives
parents a right to closely monitor their children 's activities.
In addition to the parental duty to protect the child from the dan-
gers, penalties, and stigmas associated with criminal activity, that parents
can be held responsible for their children's criminal acts gives parents a
right to do some investigation into their children's actions. The doctrine
of vicarious consent allows such an investigation without sacrificing the
child's right to privacy any more than is reasonably necessary to protect
the child.
When it comes to criminal activity, parents are often held at least
partially responsible-either financially or criminally-for acts commit-
ted by their children. In some states, this assignment of financial respon-
sibility is affixed by statute. For example, California law requires that
upon conviction for certain graffiti-related crimes, "[i]f a minor is per-
sonally unable to pay any fine levied for [the crimes] the parent or legal
guardian of the minor shall be liable for payment of the fine."3 40 Simi-
larly, Idaho law states that "[u]nless the court determines that an order of
restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order the [of-
fending] juvenile or his parents or both to pay restitution to or make
whole any victim who suffers an economic loss as a result of the juve-
nile's conduct.,, 34' Texas is another state has adopted a parental liability
law. Texas' law reads:
A parent or other person who has the duty of control and reasonable
discipline of a child is liable for any property damage proximately
339. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 814 (citations omitted).
340. CAL. PENAL CODE § 640.5(d)(2) (West 2005); see also id. § 490.5(b) (holding parents
jointly responsible with a minor child for the payment of restitution arising out of a theft offense).
341. IDAHO CODE § 20-520(3) (Michie 2005).
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caused by: (I) the negligent conduct of the child if the conduct is
reasonably attributable to the negligent failure of the parent or other
person to exercise that duty; or (2) the wilful and malicious conduct
of a child who is at least 10 years of age but under 18 years of age.
342
Many other jurisdictions have enacted similar laws.343
In addition to financial liability, many jurisdictions impose criminal
liability if a parent is found to have contributed to the delinquency of a
child by means of neglect or otherwise. Under Kentucky law, for exam-
ple, a "parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or
custody of a minor is guilty of endangering the welfare of a minor when
he fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such
child to prevent him from becoming a ... delinquent child., 344 Missouri
law provides another example of parental liability:
A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a child in
the second degree if ... [b]eing a parent, guardian, or other person
legally charged with the care or custody of a child less than seven-
teen years old, he recklessly fails or refuses to exercise reasonable
diligence in the care or control of such child to prevent him from
coming within the provisions of the state's juvenile criminal
laws. 45
Oklahoma has a parental responsibility law, which legislates that
any parent who "knowingly and willfully ... causes, aids, abets, or en-
courages any minor to be in need of supervision.. . [or] shall by any act
or omission to act have caused, encouraged, or contributed to the . . .
need of supervision of the minor ... shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor." 346 Oklahoma law also provides for criminal liability if a parent
fails to comply with a court's order for juvenile probation. 347 These types
342. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2005).
343. For more on these types of laws, see generally Christine T. Greenwood, Holding Parents
Criminally Responsible for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children: Reasoned Response or "Knee-
Jerk Reaction "?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 401 (1997).
344. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(l) (Banks Baldwin 2005).
345. MO. REV. STAT. § 568.050.1(3) (West 2005). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 163.577(l)(a)
(2005): "A person commits the offense of failing to supervise a child if the person is the parent,
lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the care or custody of a child under 15 years
of age and the child: (a) Commits an act that brings the child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court ... [or] (b) Violates a curfew law ... [or] (c) Fails to attend school as required under [Oregon
law]."
346. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 858.1 (2005).
347. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 858.2 (2005).
[Vol. 28:9551018
Wiretaps & Vicarious Consent
of parental liability laws have been in existence in the United States in
various forms for more than one hundred years.348
Because parents can be held financially and otherwise liable for
criminal acts committed by their children, parents should be permitted to
closely monitor their children's activities when they believe that doing so
is in the child's best interest. This should include a right to record phone
conversations between their child and an outside party when the princi-
ples of the vicarious consent doctrine are met. By allowing parents this
type of opportunity, they will have a better chance to stop their children
from engaging in criminal behavior that might ultimately affect the par-
ent either financially or criminally, while still allowing their children to
have a reasonable degree of privacy.349
3. Applying the doctrine in the criminal context helps
protect society from dangerous criminals.
One of the more significant benefits of applying the doctrine of vi-
carious consent in the criminal context, and thereby allowing for the use
of intercepted telephone and other communications during a criminal
trial, is that doing so can provide considerable protections to society.
Permitting prosecutors to use recordings made in conformance with the
principles of the vicarious consent doctrine would benefit society in a
number of ways. Doing so will assist in protecting society from danger-
ous sexual predators or other criminals who would seek to take advan-
tage of young children in one way or another. When, for whatever rea-
son, victims do not disclose sexual abuse, as was the case in Barboza and
Bishop, such abuse can be difficult to detect and properly investigate. 350
Recognizing the vicarious consent doctrine, and allowing parents to in-
voke it when the circumstances appropriately dictate, will assist parents
in identifying those persons who are victimizing their children. Further-
more, sexual abuse cases such as Barboza and Bishop can be difficult to
prosecute, and allowing prosecutors to use these legally created re-
cordings can only help in their efforts to take dangerous criminals off our
streets-a benefit to everyone. In short, recognizing the doctrine of vi-
carious consent will "make . . . it easier to identify and locate the per-
son(s) responsible for attempting to involve a child in criminal activity
affecting the welfare or best interest of such child, as well as prosecute
348. See generally Howard Davidson, Violence in America: How Can We Save Our Children?,
7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996).
349. See supra Part lII.A. l.d.
350. See, e.g., Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917, 918-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (describing how
difficult it was for law enforcement to investigate Bishop when the victim refused to cooperate).
20051 1019
Seattle University Law Review
any person(s) responsible for engaging in criminal conduct involving
such child as a victim." 35 ' The same is true when other types of crimes-
such as drug-related crimes, property crimes, and violent crimes-are
involved as well. 52
Conversely, by not recognizing the doctrine of vicarious consent,
courts can potentially injure those they intend to protect. There is little
doubt that "[t]he absence of a vicarious consent doctrine could endanger
children whose needs for protection would go unmet without it."'353 The
Williams court, which rejected the doctrine, said as much in its opinion,
stating that "[w]e, too, can admittedly perceive situations where depriv-
ing a parent of the ability to vicariously consent for a child may deprive
the child of the parent's ability to protect the child. 3 54 Additionally, by
not allowing prosecutors to use recorded conversations as evidence, a
court would actually provide an evidentiary benefit to the criminal,
whose rights were in no way violated by state or private action as the
parents who made the recording were acting on their own and the re-
cordings were intercepted lawfully. In short, there is a significant possi-
bility that not recognizing the vicarious consent doctrine will have nega-
tive effects on society in general and children in particular in that it will
provide criminals with a better chance of escaping responsibility for their
crimes.
As stated above, the vicarious consent doctrine is very much con-
sistent with the language and congressional intent of Title III, as well as
those long-standing principles of law that recognize the right and duty of
parents to make certain decisions for and protect their children.355 Addi-
tionally, the doctrine is consistent with and helps further the goals of pro-
tecting children and society from criminals, criminal acts, and the devas-
tating consequences that can result when a child is either the victim or
perpetrator of a crime. 356 When all these things are considered, it be-
comes clear that the vicarious consent doctrine and the criminal law in-
termingle and compliment each other to the degree that they can work
together to benefit society without unnecessarily violating a child's right
to privacy. For these reasons, criminal courts in both the state and federal
systems should recognize the vicarious consent doctrine and when the
situation arises such that communications are intercepted in conformance
351. Aaronson, supra note 213, at 833.
352. See generally id.
353. Labriola, supra note 53, at 461.
354. Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
355. See supra Part lII.A.
356. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
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with the doctrine, permit the use of intercepted communications as evi-
dence during the course of a criminal trial.
C. The Problems Associated with a Civil Use of the Doctrine Are Not As
Significant When the Doctrine Is Applied in Criminal Cases
As referenced in Part II.C of this article, a number of criticisms
have been leveled against the doctrine of vicarious consent, particularly
as it has been used in civil custody disputes. While many of those criti-
cisms have merit with respect to civil cases, they do not all carry over
into the area of criminal prosecutions that are based in part upon tele-
phone conversations surreptitiously recorded by a concerned parent. To
put it another way, at least some of the criticisms or problems associated
with a custody dispute or other civil use of the doctrine are not as signifi-
cant when the doctrine is applied in a purely criminal case, and for that
reason criminal courts should be willing to accept the vicarious consent
doctrine.
1. The doctrine is subject to misuse by conniving parents.
As stated above, one of the major criticisms leveled against the doc-
trine of vicarious consent, particularly in the civil context, is that it is
subject to misuse by conniving or self-serving parents.357 In the case of a
custody dispute following the dissolution of a marriage or other child-
bearing relationship, it is easy to see how parents fighting one another for
the custody or for the perceived love of a child might have hard feelings
toward the other parent-feelings that would interfere with or at least
play into a parent's decision to intercept a child's phone conversations
with the other parent. The facts of Thompson and Pollock lend credence
to this view. Both cases involved custody disputes, and there were strong
feelings of contempt between the bickering parents, which resulted in
accusations of wrongdoing and impure motives in regard to the recording
of the conversations at issue. The Pollock court noted this:
According to Samuel and Laura, Sandra was not motivated by
concern for Courtney when she recorded the phone conversations.
Instead, they contended that Sandra was angry that Courtney had
taped a conversation between herself and Sandra with Samuel and
Laura's consent, and "wanted to return the favor by taping Court-
ney's conversations with Sam and [Laura]." Laura further contends
that . . ."Sandra's predominant motive in eavesdropping on the
357. See supra Part II.C.1.
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children's calls was to overhear Courtney's confidential, attorney-
client conversations with her lawyer." 358
When proof of such motives exists, the doctrine of vicarious con-
sent would not apply to protect the parent who is making tape recordings
of a child's phone conversations. And in child custody situations, deter-
mining the real motivation behind a recording can be extremely difficult
and alleging misuse of the doctrine can be extremely easy. In short, the
use of the doctrine in the civil context does lend itself to the possibility of
misuse by ill-motivated parents, or, at the very least, potentially harmful
allegations of misuse.359
The situation is different in those circumstances in which a parent
records conversations between a child and a nonfamily member out of
concern that the child is being victimized or is engaging or thinking
about engaging in criminal behavior. In Barboza, for example, the mi-
nor's parents were both involved in the recording of his conversations
with Barboza, and, as the court noted, "everything they did was... to try
to figure out what was going on and what's right for their son and for
their family., 360 It is apparent from the court's description of the facts
and the motivations underlying the making of the recordings that there
was no misuse of the doctrine by conniving or bickering parents in the
Barboza criminal case as was alleged in the Pollock civil case. 361 There
were no attempts by the parents to undermine one another or gather in-
formation to be used against the other spouse.362 There was simply con-
cern for the well-being of a child who was being abused by a sexual
predator.3 63 The same was true in the Bishop case, as that too was not a
civil dispute between parents but a situation where parents were working
together to protect a child.364 In short, if a parent who suspects that a
child is either a victim or an actor in the commission of a crime surrepti-
358. Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
359. This is not to say that an application of the doctrine of vicarious consent does not help to
diminish the possibility of misuse in the purely civil context:
If courts require a finding of a good faith objectively reasonable basis for believing con-
sent is necessary to protect a child, the concern that parties would intercept communica-
tions solely to gain an advantage in a divorce or custody proceeding diminishes. Addi-
tionally, if the court satisfied the objectively reasonable standard and admitted the re-
corded conversation in a proceeding, concern for the child's welfare overrides any other
detrimental effect resulting from admitting the evidence.
Rahavy, supra note 21, at 97.
360. Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
361. Compare id. at 546, with Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 602-03 (6th Cir. 1998).
362. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 549.
363. Id.
364. Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
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tiously intercepts some of that child's telephone conversations in accor-
dance with the principles of the vicarious consent doctrine-meaning it
is done in an attempt to further the child's best interest and protect the
child from either victimization or the negative effects that criminal activ-
ity can have on the criminal actor-it is more likely than not that the par-
ent will be doing so not in an attempt to misuse or abuse the doctrine and
get back at the other parent, but in an attempt to find out what is going on
with a child so that the child can ultimately be protected from further
victimization.
Furthermore, one of the issues brought up by critics of the doctrine
in regard to misuse is the difficulty of proving whether or not a parent
has good or pure motives.365 In a Barboza-type situation, it should be
much easier for a parent to make a showing of good faith because there is
no custody dispute between parents to cloud the issue. Conversely, it
should also be much more difficult for an abuser to show bad faith by the
parent. In the Barboza case, for example, it is much easier to define pa-
rental motivations than it is in the Pollock case. And in those cases where
the child is believed to be or is found to be the criminal actor, it would
also be unlikely that there existed any bad faith on the part of the parent.
At the very least, when there is concern that a child is engaging in crimi-
nal behavior, a parent who seeks to learn of the behavior will rarely be
doing so in an attempt to get back at the minor child's other parent, at the
child, or at the person with whom the child is conversing. For this reason,
an appropriate application of the doctrine in the criminal context is far
less problematic with respect to the possibility of parental misuse than it
might be in a civil context.
2. The doctrine fails to recognize a child's right and ability
to make his or her own choices.
Some critics have argued that the doctrine of vicarious consent fails
to recognize a child's right and ability to make his or her own decisions
or choices. 366 This can be true in the civil context when the child is in the
middle of a custody battle and choices loom regarding which parent the
child should live with-a potentially life-changing decision for the
child-or over which parent is more fit to care for children. This argu-
ment is not as strong in the context of criminal activity as it is in other
contexts, however, as children, like adults, do not have an inherent right
365. See supra Part lI.C. I.
366. See supra Part II.C.3.
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to choose to engage in criminal activity. 367 For example, in situations
such as those at issue in the Bishop or Barboza cases, 368 a child cannot
legally choose or consent to have sexual intercourse with an adult, as the
law generally recognizes that it is illegal for adults to have sexual contact
369with minors. Similarly, the law will not recognize a minor child's right
to choose to distribute illegal drugs, steal or destroy property belonging
to someone else, or physically injure another person. 370 While people can
lawfully go into a court of law and address custody issues and the child's
views and choices with respect to that issue, they cannot do so with re-
spect to a choice to commit criminal acts. In short, allowing a use of the
vicarious consent doctrine in the criminal context-in cases in which a
parent is seeking to protect a child from victimization or from the results
of his or her own criminal activity-the minor child does not have any
lawful choices taken away. In other words, the use of the doctrine in that
context does not take away any choices that the law recognizes that the
child has a right to make.
3. The doctrine may result in interfamily discord or resentment.
One legitimate criticism of the vicarious consent doctrine, ad-
dressed above, is that its application may result in interfamily discord.3 7'
If a child wishes to engage in criminal behavior or is consenting to vic-
timization at the hands of a third party, it is possible that interfamily dis-
cord or resentment could be an immediate result of a parent recording a
child's telephone conversations. This, admittedly, is as true in the crimi-
nal context as the civil context. However, when the child is sufficiently
removed from the dangerous situation, or as the child matures later in life
and realizes the danger the he or she was in, those feelings will hopefully
367. See United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1970) ("No one has the right to
commit a crime."); see also People v. Tillman, 282 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Il1. App. Ct. 1972) ("[T]here is
no right to commit crime."); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 132, 110 P. 1020, 1028 (1910) (Mor-
ris, J. dissenting) ("No man, whether sane or insane, has any constitutional right to commit crime.");
ex parte Roper, 134 S.W. 334, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) ("No one has a right to commit crime.");
State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261, 266 (Sup. Ct. N.C. 1892) ("Criminals have no right to commit
crime.").
368. See supra Part I and Part lI.B.2.b.
369. In Idaho, for example, it is a felony for any person to "commit any lewd or lascivious act
or acts upon or with the body ... of a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years ... when such
acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
desires of such person, such minor child, or third party." IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 (Michie 2005). In
other words, it is illegal for any person, whether a child or an adult, to have sexual contact with a
child under the age of sixteen.
370. See infra note 373 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part II.C.4.
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change. The Bishop case provides an example of the change of heart that
can potentially take place in these types of situations. In Bishop, the thir-
teen year-old victim initially refused to cooperate with law enforcement
and "denied that she and Bishop had engaged in any illicit behavior." 372
Later on, however, after she had been removed from the situation and
Bishop was no longer able to exert any influence over her, "[t]he victim
specifically testified that ... she was glad her parents made the tapes. 373
Because recordings made in the criminal context, unlike civil contexts,
generally will not involve a parent sneaking around and trying to find
information about the child's views on custody or attempting to gather
evidence of abuse by the other parent, it is at least possible that a child
will one day have an easier time seeing that the parents have pure mo-
tives and thereby accepting their decision as a correct one. At the very
least, that is the case when comparing the situations found in Bishop and
Pollock.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND THE USE OF THE VICARIOUS CONSENT
DOCTRINE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Because the taping of conversations that fit within the parameters of
the doctrine of vicarious consent is legal in those jurisdictions that rec-
ognize the doctrine, prosecutors should be permitted to use those re-
cordings in criminal proceedings, including proceedings against the child
for whom the parents consented. This is because those recordings are
deemed lawfully made and are not the result of inappropriate government
action.374 However, because such a recording would be presumptively
illegal save for the fact that the circumstances are such that the doctrine
of vicarious consent applies, 375 prosecutors should bear the burden of
proving that the core elements of the doctrine are met before a recording
can be deemed admissible in a trial or other hearing. Specifically, when
the admissibility of the recordings is challenged, prosecutors should be
required to provide the court with proof that the recordings were made by
a parent because of concern for a minor child's welfare and a belief that
doing so would promote the child's best interests, and not for some other
inappropriate reason.376 When prosecutors are unable to do so, courts
372. Bishop v. State, 526 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
373. Id. at 919.
374. See supra Part II.B.2.a. and the cases cited therein.
375. Id.
376. If a court chooses not to recognize the vicarious consent doctrine, a parent's surreptitious
recording of her child's conversations are not automatically excluded from evidence in a criminal
prosecution. This issue was addressed by the Barboza court, which held that the vicarious consent
doctrine was not applicable to Massachusetts' state wiretap statute, which requires two-party con-
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should appropriately refuse to allow the admission of those recordings at
a criminal trial. When the prosecutor is able to do so, however, courts
should recognize the fact that the recordings were not illegally made and
therefore should be deemed admissible at a criminal trial.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1993, in the case of Thompson v. Dulaney, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah held for the first time that a parent or
guardian can surreptitiously record a minor child's telephone conversa-
tions without violating Title III when the parent has a good faith and ob-
jectively reasonable belief that doing so is in the best interest of the
child.377 Since that time a small handful of courts and one progressive
state legislature have adopted this holding, which has become known as
the doctrine of vicarious consent.378 While the doctrine has its critics, it is
a legally viable and socially beneficial doctrine that should be more
widely utilized throughout the United States in both the federal and state
legal systems.3 79 In particular, until more states follow the lead of the
Georgia Legislature and codify the doctrine of vicarious consent, 380 it
should be more widely accepted by the criminal courts such that prosecu-
tors should be permitted to use surreptitiously intercepted communica-
tions in criminal trials when the recording is obtained in accordance with
the doctrine.
Criminal courts should recognize the doctrine and allow use of sur-
reptitiously recorded conversations for a handful of reasons. First, as
stated above, the doctrine is both legally viable and socially beneficial. 38'
The doctrine is legally viable in the sense that its acceptance is consistent
sent, writing that "[e]xclusionary rules generally are intended to deter future police conduct in viola-
tion of constitutional or statutory rights." Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 552 (Mass
App. Ct. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santoro, 548 N.E.2d 862, 862 (Mass. 1990)). As such,
the court continued, "we see no reason why the [exclusionary] rule should protect [Barboza] from
the consequences of the unlawful interception by a private citizen, a father, acting in the privacy of
his own home, without any government involvement, to protect his child from sexual exploitation by
[Barboza]." Id. at 553; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("This Court
has . . . consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures and the subsequent suppression of illegally obtained evidence] as proscribing only govern-
mental action; it is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by
a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge
of any governmental official."') (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting)).
377. See supra Part lI.B.2.a.
378. See supra Part II.B.2.
379. See supra Part II.C. and Part III.A.
380. See supra Part I.B.3.
381. See supra Part III.A.
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with the legislative history to Title III and the view that the one-party
consent exception contained in Title III should be interpreted broadly.
382
Additionally, the doctrine recognizes and is consistent with the long-
standing principle that parents have a right to decide what is best for their
children, even if it causes the children to suffer some invasion of pri-
vacy.383 The doctrine is socially beneficial in that it provides some degree
of protection to both children and parents who wish to look out for their
children's best interests.3 84 Second, criminal courts should recognize the
doctrine of vicarious consent because it helps to further the goals of
criminal law without causing an excessive violation of a child's or a de-
385fendant's privacy. Specifically, the doctrine assists law enforcement
and prosecutors in prosecuting dangerous criminals and, at the same
time, works to protect children and society from the dangers, penalties,
and other negative effects of criminal activity. 386 And because recordings
that meet the standards of the doctrine are deemed lawfully obtained, the
criminal's right to privacy in the original communication is in no way
violated. Finally, while critics argue that the doctrine is flawed, its prob-
lems are not nearly as significant when the doctrine is applied in the
criminal cases as they are in those civil cases in which the doctrine is
applicable.3 87
For these reasons, until more legislatures codify the doctrine,
criminal courts faced with the issue of dealing with a surreptitiously-
recorded telephone conversation between a minor child and another per-
son should choose to accept the vicarious consent doctrine in such a way
that parents and prosecutors can use the telephone conversations to pro-
tect both the minor child and society as a whole.
382. See supra Part III.A.I.b.
383. See supra Part III.A.I.c.
384. See supra Part 111.A.2.
385. See supra Part III.A.I.d.
386. See supra Part II.A.2.
387. See supra Part III.C.
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